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Abstract
Three experiments examine  how expressions of probability concerning why a risk 
involved in a medical procedure was not disclosed influence mock juror decisions (e.g., 
liability, culpability, and damage awards). Across all three experiments, no differences 
were found in mock juror judgments of liability due to the probability expression used, 
be it verbal, quantitative, percentage, or frequency. Furthermore, differences in mean 
damage awards were only found when psychological uncertainty was manipulated using 
a frequency expression. However, an examination of the median damage awards 
suggests that some expressions of probability are likely to result in higher damage 
awards than others. Thus, while the type of probability expression used does not appear 
to influence whether or not a physician-defendant is found liable, it may have an impact 
on the size of the damage award. A fourth experiment examines how expressions of 
probability concerning a non-disclosed risk influence decisions of whether or not a 
patient should undergo treatment. The results of this experiment indicate that hindsight 
(i.e., knowledge of the complication occurring during surgery) may have played a role in 
the results of Experiments 1-3. Implications and recommendations for physicians and 
lawyers are discussed.
vi
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Introduction/Informed Consent 
What constitutes a truly informed patient? The legal answer is one who has 
received all relevant information necessary for him/her to make a reasonable decision 
(Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Jasper, 1996; Lidz et al., 1983; F. Rozovsky, 1990). In 
medical situations, this would include an explanation of what the treatment would 
involve, the benefits and risks associated with the treatment, and available alternatives 
(including non-treatment). While this appears to answer the question, the devil is in the 
details, or in this case, the lack of details. For example how are “relevant” and “all” 
determined? Are the same things relevant to all patients, or does disclosure need to be 
tailored to each individual? Is a risk relevant based on the frequency of occurrence, the 
severity of the risk involved, some combination of the two, or something else entirely?
Is merely mentioning a risk enough or does it require further explanation, and if so, how 
much and in what manner? With few exceptions the law does not define the amount and 
type of information necessary for informed consent (e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.40 E).
This ambiguity in the informed consent laws has been a source of frustration for 
physicians, and has led to perceptions that the laws are just legal ploys allowing 
disgruntled patients to recover damages in situations involving a bad outcome that is not 
the result of negligence (Curran, 1970; DeLee, 1976; Slovenko, 1997). Physicians have 
also viewed informing the patient as an impediment to successfully performing their job 
not only because informing the patient is time consuming for both the patient and the 
physician, but because it is cruel, punitive, and inexcusable to mention all the possible 
negative outcomes to a patient already suffering from the fear of undergoing procedures
1
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such as surgery (DeLee, 1976). Some also feel that consent forms would necessarily 
frighten many patients away from treatments that would be beneficial to them (DeLee, 
1976). While the resistance to informed consent is no longer as strong as it once was,1 
physicians are still concerned about the lack of explicit guidelines constituting what 
“informed” means (Daniels & Andrews, 1989).
The current experiments are designed to explore what factors influence jurors’ 
determination of liability in informed consent cases. This will not only provide 
physicians with some suggestions for protecting themselves against lawsuits, but may 
also improve physician-patient communication resulting in improved care. Before 
describing the current experiments, I will provide a brief overview of informed consent 
law.
While many people consider informed consent to be just a form they sign in order 
to receive treatment, health care providers who treat it as such may face malpractice 
claims. A number of commentators from different professions have written about the 
proliferation of malpractice claims based on a lack of informed consent (Curran, 1970; 
Eisner, 1985; Hirsh and Wilcox, 1992; Slovenko, 1997). William Curran (1970) of 
Harvard Medical School claims that failure to obtain informed consent is one of the two
bindings that patient satisfaction and good physician-patient communication, 
both of which presumably result from better informed consent, lead to fewer malpractice 
claims have softened the blow of the extra work required to obtain an informed consent 
(Dobson, 1989; Levinson 1994; Levinson, Roter, Mullooly, Dull, & Frankel, 1997; Mark 
& Spiro, 1990; L. Rozovsky, 1990).
2
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favorite plaintiff doctrines of courtroom attack (the other being res ipsa loquitur)}
Hirsh and Wilcox (1992), both lawyers, claim that over the past 20 years the failure to 
disclose medical risks has become a major and steadily increasing source of recovering 
damages in malpractice cases. They claim that when malpractice lawyers are unable to 
prove negligent medical treatment, their fallback position is that the health care provider 
neglected to obtain the patient’s informed consent and that the plaintiffs injuries resulted 
from risks that the patient would not have been willing to accept had the information 
been disclosed to him. Likewise, Slovenko (1997) described informed consent as a ploy 
developed “to provide another course of action in cases of poor outcome when 
negligence in treatment could not be established” (p. 652).
The data concerning the frequency of malpractice claims neither clearly support 
nor contradict physicians’ concern that the changes in informed consent laws would 
increase either the number of malpractice claims made, or the number of lawsuits 
resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners found that the issue of informed consent was raised as an issue in only 
3% of the malpractice cases resolved between 1975 and 1976 (Law & Polan, 1978). 
Likewise, the Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973), created by the Secretary of 
the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, determined that informed 
consent was the most significant issue in only 2.4% of all appellate malpractice decisions 
nationwide through 1971. Robertson (1991) determined that there had been little impact
translated, this means the situation speaks for itself. This refers to a common 
sense inference that something occurred that would only occur if someone else was 
careless (e.g., physician amputates the wrong foot).
3
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on the frequency or severity of malpractice claims in the ten years after the Supreme 
Court of Canada introduced major changes in the law of informed consent.
On the other hand, Annas (1976) indicates that while very few claims are filed 
solely on the grounds of a lack of informed consent (and fewer still have resulted in a 
verdict for the plaintiff) an increasing number of lawsuits filed against physicians include 
the allegation of a lack of informed consent. Danzon (1986) showed that, in 1976, 
jurisdictions that had adopted informed consent laws by 1970 had claims costs nearly 
double that of states which had not yet adopted informed consent laws. Similarly, a 
report, published by the American Hospital Association (Ludlam, 1978), stated that in 
the mid-1970s an allegation of failure to obtain informed consent was made in 14% of all 
malpractice cases filed.
While the evidence is somewhat conflicting concerning the frequency of claims of 
a lack of informed consent, the arguments espoused above (e.g., Curran, 1970; Hirsh & 
Wilcox, 1992; Slovenko, 1997) are indicative of the perception of a medical malpractice 
crisis (e.g., increased filings and outrageous damage awards) brought about in part by an 
overly permissive legal system (Daniels & Andrews, 1989; Eisner, 1985). This is 
important in that if health care providers are overly concerned about facing a malpractice 
claim, it could affect the quality of their care. That is, their focus may be on what they 
can do to protect themselves instead of on what is in the best interest of the patient. For 
example, physicians may refuse to treat non-emergent cases that are either difficult or are 
just as likely to get worse as they are to get better for fear that they will be sued if the 
patient does not recover. Furthermore, they may fail to mention new, innovative
4
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treatments for fear of the patient choosing that treatment, then suing after a bad outcome 
because the risks of new treatment were not folly explained. Even if the data do not 
support these beliefs, they still have the potential to influence health care provider 
behavior.
Legal Requirements of Informed Consent
In 1957, the case of Salgo v. Lelanri Stanford Jr.. University Board of Trustees 
changed the physician-patient relationship from one of physician beneficence to one of 
patient autonomy. In this case, the patient had consented to an aortography which 
resulted in paralysis from the waist down. However, the patient had not known that 
paralysis was a risk involved in this procedure. Drawing on previous cases that had 
established a right against unauthorized touching in relation to medical procedures (i.e., 
Mohrv Williams 1905: Schloendorff v. The Society of New York Hospitals. 1914), the 
court held that it was not enough for a surgeon to obtain consent to a procedure, but 
that it had to be an informed consent. To obtain informed consent, the physician must 
disclose all facts relevant to a patient’s rights and interests, as well as the risks, hazards, 
and dangers involved (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Jasper, 1996; Lidz et al., 1983; F. 
Rozovsky, 1990), enabling the patient to make the final decision of whether or not to 
undergo the procedure. This decision must be made voluntarily with no coercion, 
duress, or undue influence by the health care provider3 (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986;
3An attempt has been made in this paper to use “health care provider,” instead of 
physician or doctor, as an indication that these laws apply to a wide range of care givers 
in addition to physicians (e.g., nurses, therapists, etc.). However, the term physician is
occasionally used for ease of reading or if a study specifically refers to only physicians.
5
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Jasper, 1996; lidz et aL, 1983; F. Rozovsky, 1990). This case clearly changed the role 
of the patient from one of passive recipient to active consumer of medical care.
Informed consent is necessary for all types of treatment and investigative 
procedures, whether they are routine or highly invasive (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; F. 
Rozovsky, 1990). It is not merely the signing of a form giving permission to proceed, 
but a process in which both the patient and health care provider exchange information 
allowing the patient to reach an informed decision concerning whether or not to undergo 
the proposed treatment (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990). Indeed, 
signed forms are not even legally necessary, although they are helpful for documentation 
purposes. For this process to be effective, both the patient and the health care provider 
must be active participants. Obviously, the patient requires active input from the health 
care provider in order to obtain the details necessary to reach a decision regarding the 
treatment (i.e., risks, benefits, and alternatives). The patient must also actively provide 
information (i.e., accurate medical history) so the health care provider is aware of any 
complicating conditions (e.g., drug sensitivities) that may affect the treatment choice.
The patient is also responsible for informing the health care provider about any 
particularly strong feelings toward potential side effects or outcomes (e.g., if a woman 
wants to have children a hysterectomy as a preventative measure may not be acceptable) 
so he can tailor the disclosure to the particular patient.
Criteria for a Valid Consent
To determine whether the consent given is legally valid, a number of basic criteria 
must be met (Flowers, 1987; Forrest, Perez, & Kawamura, 1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
6
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First, the consent must have been given voluntarily. Health care providers are permitted 
to urge patients to follow a given recommendation; however, they are not allowed to 
coerce or obtain the consent from a patient under duress. Second, the patient must be 
both legally and mentally competent to give authorization (Dymek, Marson, & Harrell, 
1999). A person is presumed to be mentally competent to give consent unless a judicial 
order or an applicable piece of legislation states otherwise. Third, the patient must 
possess sufficient information in order to reach a decision (Chalmers & Swartz, 1993; 
Flowers, 1987; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
Although the amount of information required can vary among jurisdictions (see 
section on Louisiana below), all jurisdictions require that the patient be provided with at 
least: (1) the likely outcome of diagnostic tests; (2) the likely benefits of diagnostic tests 
in determining a patient’s illness or the extent of his or her injury, (3) the probable 
outcome of medical and/or surgical interventions; (4) the likely benefits from medical 
and/or surgical procedures; (5) an explanation of what a diagnostic, medical or surgical 
procedure will involve, including any probable complications, and any temporary 
discomfort, disability, or disfigurement; (6) an explanation of any permanent results of a 
medical or surgical procedure; (7) a disclosure of risks that are reasonably foreseeable at 
the time that consent is obtained; (8) the disclosure of remote risks that are probable for 
particular patients (e.g., patients with long-standing histories of severe allergic reactions 
to foods and medicines should be informed of the risk of an allergic reaction to contrast 
dye used in diagnostic tests; those without such histories need not be informed); and (9)
7
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the availability of reasonable alternative procedures (Chalmers & Swartz, 1993; Flowers, 
1987; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
The fourth criterion requires the disclosure of information to be at a level that is 
understandable to the patient (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Flowers, 1987; Forrest et al., 
1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990). Presenting the information at too high a level may cause 
patients to become too embarrassed or intimidated to admit not understanding 
something. Alternatively, presenting the information at too low a level may insult 
patients to the point that they do not ask pertinent questions. Either way can lead to the 
patient’s M ure to obtain and/or understand enough information to make an informed 
decision.
The final criterion of informed consent concerns how the health care provider 
responds to a patient’s questions. First, the patient must have the opportunity to ask 
questions. Second, any question that is asked should be answered in as straightforward a 
manner as possible, taking the needs and health of the patient into account. This allows 
health care providers to withhold certain information if, in their medical judgment, its 
disclosure might endanger a patient’s health. However, this is permitted only in limited 
situations and if challenged, the health care provider must prove the decision was 
reasonable in the circumstances. The withholding of information is not permitted just 
because the disclosure may result in the patient refusing treatment, nor can the notion 
that “Doctor knows best” be the basis of the decision (F. Rozovsky, 1990).
Who Must Ohtain the Informed Consent? The duty to disclose the relevant 
information to the patient M s on the health care provider who will perform the
8
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diagnostic test, medical treatment, or surgery. This is based on the premise that the 
health care provider performing the procedure has the most information and is best able 
to handle any questions posed by the patient. Liability for M ure to obtain an informed 
consent is limited to the actual health care provider performing the procedure. That is, 
hospitals cannot be held responsible for a lack of informed consent for a procedure 
performed on their premises, unless it can be shown that the hospital knew, or should 
have known, that a health care provider had not obtained a patient’s consent (Faden & 
Beauchamp, 1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
Legal Standards. There are two basic legal standards against which to judge 
liability: (I) the medical community (or standard practice) standard; and (2) the patient 
need (or reasonable person) standard. Initially, all informed consent cases fell under the 
medical community standard (Dailey, 1994; Dobson, 1989; McMahon, 1986; Minter, 
1984; Olcott, 1989), which is the same standard used in medical negligence cases. 
Today, more and more jurisdictions are changing to the patient need standard (Dailey, 
1994; Olcott, 1989).
Under the medical community standard, the health care provider is only required 
to disclose information that would be disclosed by other health care providers in the 
same community (Dailey, 1994; Dobson, 1989; Olcott, 1989; F. Rozovsky, 1990). In 
trying cases under this standard, expert testimony (i.e., of other health care providers) is 
required to establish what the common practice is. There are some problems with using 
this standard. First, what needs to be disclosed is defined by the very people whom the 
lawsuits would be brought against. Thus, the medical community may decide that
9
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disclosure of any number of risks is not necessary, thereby making it impossible for 
health care providers to be found liable for malpractice even if disclosure would have 
caused the patient to refuse treatment.
Another problem is that the medical community standard is not defined exactly 
the same in all jurisdictions. One definition is agreement by “a considerable number” 
(Dailey, 1994, p. 713) of health care providers regarding the correct course of treatment. 
Thus, health care providers may hesitate to use innovative medical treatments that have 
not yet obtained this level of acceptance for fear of the patient choosing said alternative 
and then having the basis for a liability claim (Dailey, 1994). This situation not only 
deprives patients of control over their treatment, as intended by informed consent 
statutes, but it actually provides a disincentive for health care providers to try innovative 
or new treatments, thereby slowing the advance of medical care.
Under the patient need standard, first established in Canterbury v. Spence (1972), 
the requirement for informed consent is what a reasonable person in the patient’s 
position would have done. Here, the amount of information that is required to make an 
informed decision is based on what the patient needs to know, not on what the health 
care provider deems appropriate. In cases using this standard, plaintiffs are allowed to 
state that if they had been informed, prior to undergoing treatment, of the risk of the 
negative outcome that occurred, they would not have agreed to it. Hindsight can 
definitely play a role here, in that the negative outcome has already occurred and it is 
difficult to determine what patients actually would have chosen to do had they been fully 
informed. No expert testimony is required under this standard.
10
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Critics of the reasonable person standard claim that it is not in the best interest of
either the patient or the health care provider and is impossible to satisfy. For example,
one claim is that only physicians have the ability to estimate effectively the psychological
and physical ramifications that disclosure might produce in a patient. Another claim is
that the reasonable person standard is too burdensome, causing physicians to waste time
in reviewing every possible risk with the patient, thereby interfering with the physician’s
discretion to determine what form of treatment is appropriate for the patient (Olcott,
1989). Finally, once the plaintiff states that he/she should have been informed about
something, the burden is shifted to the health care provider to prove why that
information was not disclosed. However, under the medical community standard, the
response to why a patient was not informed may simply be “no one else does either,”
which is equally undesirable.
Informed Consent in Louisiana
Louisiana has one of the most detailed informed consent laws. In 1975,
Louisiana attempted to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the informed consent laws by
passing the Louisiana Uniform Consent Law (La. R.S. 40:1299.40). This law states that,
unless it is proven that the consent was obtained by a misrepresentation of material facts,
it will be presumed to be valid as long as the following conditions were met:
1. The physician told the patient the nature and purpose of the
procedure together with the risks, if any, of death, brain damage, 
quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss of function of an organ or limb, 
and of disfiguring scars associated with such procedures.
11
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2. The physician acknowledges that such disclosure of information 
has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure 
have been answered in a satisfactory manner.
3. The consent is signed by the patient.
Not only did this law make it very difficult to establish the claim of a lack of 
informed consent, the risks included in the first condition were considered to be all the 
relevant risks that had to be disclosed regardless of the procedure. This law was upheld 
until 1989 when the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in Hondroulis v. Schnmaker (1989) 
that “loss of function of an organ” was too vague, and that health care providers needed 
to disclose material risks (i.e., those that a reasonable person would need to know in 
order to decide whether or not to undergo the proposed treatment).4 As a result, 
physicians began to list as many risks as possible (in some cases over 100) because they 
were not sure what a court would determine to be material in hindsight (Palmisano,
1995).
Then, in 1990 Louisiana created the Medical Disclosure Panel (R.S. 40:1299.40 
E). This panel was created “within the Department of Health and Hospitals to determine 
which risks and hazards related to medical care and surgical procedures must be 
disclosed by a physician or other health care provider to a patient or persons authorized 
to consent for a patient and to establish the general form and substance of such 
disclosure” (pg. 2, La R.S. 40:1299.40 E). The panel consists of six physicians, three 
attorneys from the Louisiana Trial Lawyers’ Association, one attorney from the
4Note that this helped to solidify Louisiana’s adoption of the reasonable person 
standard.
12
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Louisiana Defense Counsel Association, and one dentist who specializes in oral and 
maxillofacial surgery. This amendment to R.S. 40:1299.40 listed the following five 
requirements that must be met by the health care provider in order to be covered by the 
provisions of the statute:
1. Disclosure of the risks and hazards in the form and to the degree 
required by the panel.
2. Disclosure of additional risks, if any, particular to a patient 
because of a complicating medical condition, either told to the 
physician or other health care provider by the patient or his 
representative in a medical history of the patient or reasonably 
discoverable by such physician or other health care provider.
3. Disclosure of reasonable therapeutic alternative and risks 
associated with such alternatives.
4. Relate that he is obtaining a consent to medical treatment 
pursuant to the lists formulated by the Louisiana Medical 
Disclosure Panel.
5. Provide an opportunity to ask any questions about the 
contemplated medical or surgical procedure, risks, or alternatives 
and acknowledge in writing that he answered such questions, to 
the patient or other person authorized to give consent to medical 
treatment, receipt of which shall be acknowledged in writing.
As of April, 2000, the Louisiana Medical Disclosure Panel has determined the risks
required to be disclosed for 176 different procedures, and continues to meet to update
their findings.
Phvsician-Patient Communication
Informed consent laws have determined that patients should be provided a great 
deal of information about their illness and treatment. But do patients want all of this 
information? A number of studies indicate that the vast majority of people (with the
13
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possible exception of elderly patients) desire to be informed about their care, even if it 
includes negative information (Benbassat, Pilpel, & Tidhar, 1998; Deber, 1994; 
Guadagnoli & Ward, 1998; Mazur & Hickam, 1997a, 1997b; Strull, Lo, & Charles, 
1984; Thompson, Pitts, & Schwankovsky, 1993). Lidz et al. (1983) identified four 
reasons why patients wish to be informed: (1) to facilitate compliance; (2) to be shown 
respect; (3) to overrule physicians’ decisions (rarely); and (4) to play an active role in 
decision making (only 10% of the patients).
Studies comparing patients (Degner & Sloan, 1992; Strull et al., 1984) and non­
patients (Deber, Kraetschmer, & Irvie, 1996; Degner & Sloan, 1992; Strull et al., 1984) 
have found that non-patients report a higher desire for information (Benbassat et al., 
1998; Degner, 1998; Degner & Sloan, 1992). This occurs even when hypothetical 
situations are presented to both populations (Ende, Kazis, Ash, & Moskowitz, 1989). 
Benbassat et al. (1998) suggest that non-patient preferences may reflect ideal or 
normative expectations, while those elicited from patients (typically with chronic illness) 
reflect more realistic expectations. Thus, one potential problem with jurors determining 
liability is that their desire for information may be different from the patients who must 
actually make the treatment choice.
Since it is clear that patients desire to be informed, one must next consider the 
patient’s ability to understand the information they are given. No matter how much 
information is disclosed, if the patient does not understand it, then informed consent has 
not been achieved (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). Common sense suggests that the 
information needs to be presented in concise, non-technical ways, although it is not clear
14
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as to what is the “best” way to present the information (Entwistle, Sheldon, Sowden, & 
Watt, 1998; Levinson, 1997).
One area that may be particularly problematic is the communication of the risks 
involved with a given procedure. This information is often described in probabilistic 
terms and a great amount of research has shown that people are generally poor 
processors of probabilistic information (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1972; Saks & Kidd, 1980; Weinstein, 1999), especially when the 
probabilities involved are less than 1%, which is often the case in medical risk 
communication (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Halpem, Blackman, & Salzman, 1989; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Stone, Yates, & Parker, 1994).
How the probabilistic information is expressed can also be problematic because 
physicians (and other professionals) prefer to use verbal expressions of probability (e.g., 
“rare” or “common”) when discussing uncertainty (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Eddy, 1990; 
Merz, Druzdzel, & Mazur, 1991; Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth,
1986). Not only have the interpretations of these expressions been shown to be highly 
variable (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Cohen, Deamley, & Hansel, 
1958; Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967), but the manner in which people use them has also 
been shown to be inconsistent (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; but see 
Kong, Barnett, Mosteller, & Youtz, 1986 for an exception).
This lack of clear consistency has caused some commentators to suggest that 
expressions of uncertainty should always be made with a quantitative estimate (Nakao & 
Axelrod, 1983; Shaw & Dear, 1990). This is bolstered by the evidence that even though
15
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people prefer to give estimates of probability using verbal phrases, they prefer to receive 
estimates of probability in numeric form (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Moxey & Sanford, 2000; 
Olsen & Budescu, 1997; Shaw & Dear, 1990). However, it is not clear that patients 
would necessarily understand and use quantitative estimates appropriately since, as 
mentioned above, people are not good processors of probabilistic information 
(Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Furthermore, there are multiple 
ways in which to present quantitative information (i.e., percentages, frequencies, and 
probabilities), and these may be interpreted differently.
Juror Reactions to Probability Evidence
With improved technology (e.g., computer modeling and data analysis programs) 
and scientific advances (e.g., DNA typing), the amount and type of statistical and 
probability evidence that is available for use has greatly increased (Faigman & Baglioni, 
1988; Schklar & Diamond, 1999). The courts, however, have typically greeted 
statistical and probabilistic evidence with skepticism and suspicion (Ellsworth & Mauro, 
1998; Koehler, 1992). Some legal commentators have claimed that because people 
(including judges) have a difficult time understanding probabilities, the potential for 
abuse is high (Tribe, 1971). One argument is that probabilistic evidence gives the 
appearance of precision, and as such, jurors will place too much weight on this evidence 
(Tribe, 1971). Another criticism of probabilistic evidence is that because it only 
describes what happens in general, it is useless forjudging what happened in a particular 
case (Ellsworth & Mauro, 1998; Tribe, 1971). Indeed some jurisdictions have used
16
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these reasons to deny the inclusion of associative evidence5 (although the majority of 
jurisdictions allow it), such as blood and fiber matching (Jonakait, 1983; Thompson & 
Schumann, 1987).
The empirical evidence, though, indicates that people actually underweight 
probability information in both legal (Faigman & Baglioni, 1988; Goodman, 1992; 
Schklar & Diamond, 1999; Smith, Penrod, Otto, & Park, 1996; Thompson & Schumann,
1987) and non-legal (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Saks & Kidd, 
1980) contexts. Saks and Kidd (1980) even suggest that rather than being overwhelmed 
by statistical information, triers of fact are likely to ignore it.
While the above studies suggest that mock jurors would not overemphasize 
probabilistic information, they indicate that people neither intuitively understand the rules 
of statistical inference (Lichtenstein, Slovic, FischhofF, Layman, & Coombs, 1978; Nisbet 
& Ross, 1980) nor properly integrate probabilistic information (Bar-Hillel, 1980; 
FischhofF & Beth-Marom, 1983; Kahneman etal., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
One suggested approach to improve probabilistic reasoning in the courts is to present 
expert testimony on how to interpret probabilistic information properly (Faigman & 
Baglioni, 1988; Finkelstein & Farley, 1970). This testimony would focus on the use of 
Bayes’ theorem to combine statistical and probabilistic evidence that might otherwise be 
difficult to understand (Finkelstein & Farley, 1970). Unfortunately this approach has not 
met with much success (Faigman & Baglioni, 1988; Goodman, 1992; Schklar &
’Associative evidence refers to matches that can be established between evidence 
found at the scene and the defendant. This includes DNA, hair, soil, glass, paint, and 
bodily fluid matching.
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Diamond, 1999; Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000; Smith, Penrod, Otto, & Park,
1996).
Recently, though, a number of studies have found that Bayesian reasoning can be 
improved by presenting probability information as frequencies instead of as percentages 
(Gigerenzer& Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Slovic et al., 2000). This 
is consistent with a growing amount of research indicating that some cognitive biases 
(e.g., base rate neglect, overconfidence, and the conjunction fallacy) can be eliminated by 
using frequency information as opposed to percentages (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; 
Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991). This issue will be more 
fully explored in Experiment 2.
Current Experiments
When jurors are presented with a lack of informed consent case, the plaintiff is 
claiming that either the risk was not disclosed at all, or the amount of information 
provided about the risk was insufficient to make a reasonable choice (i.e., the patient 
would have chosen differently had more information been provided). For any treatment, 
there is a vast amount of information that could be conveyed to the patient. While 
informed consent laws have increased the amount of information that patients receive, 
there are still no guidelines indicating how much is enough.
One might suggest that health care providers just give patients all the available 
information. However, presenting too much information may result in cognitive 
overload, thereby impairing comprehension (Doak, Doak, Friedell, & Meade, 1998;
Jolly, Scott, & Sanford, 1995). Providing too much information may also be detrimental
18
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in a lawsuit. Goebert (1979) suggests that the longer the informed consent form is, the 
less likely the patient will have read the fine print and the sooner a jury will realize that 
the patient signed a document which he/she did not understand.
Health care providers are also limited in the amount of time they are able to 
spend with each patient. Studies have shown that physicians spend an average of about 
15-20 minutes with patients in both routine visits (Levinson et al., 1997) and visits to 
discuss specific procedures (Mark & Spiro, 1990). As such, health care providers face 
the difficult challenge of determining which information should be disclosed in the limited 
amount of time they have. Then, they must make sure that the patient can understand 
the information. Thus, it would be beneficial to determine what information patients 
need to know, as well as the best way to present that information. Since Louisiana has 
created the Medical Disclosure panel to address the former, the current studies will focus 
on the latter.
As stated earlier, people generally do not process probabilistic information very 
well (Kahneman et al., 1982). Three experiments have been designed to explore the 
factors surrounding the communication of the risks associated with undergoing surgery 
to remove a tumor. Even though health care providers typically prefer to provide 
probability estimates using verbal expressions (Beth-Marom, 1982; Eddy, 1990; Merz et 
al., 1991; Wallsten et al., 1986), the high variability found in the interpretations of these 
expressions have led to the suggestion that risk communication for medical procedures 
always include a quantitative estimate (Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Shaw & Dear, 1990). 
However, no study has examined how jurors respond to probability information
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presented either verbally or quantitatively in a medical malpractice case. The first 
experiment addresses this issue, using a summary of a medical malpractice case based on 
a lack of informed consent.
While little research has directly compared verbal and quantitative estimates, 
there has been a great deal of interest in comparing different formats (i.e., frequencies 
versus percentages) of quantitative estimates (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995; Thompson & Schumann, 1987; Slovic et al., 2000). The typical finding 
is that participants respond differently to each probability format, with better 
comprehension and reasoning being associated with the frequency format. However, this 
research has focused mainly on associative evidence in criminal trials, such as blood or 
DNA matching. Experiment 2 extends this comparison to a civil trial using the same 
case summary as Experiment 1.
In addition to comparing probability formats, there has also been a great deal of 
interest in assessing “psychological uncertainty” (Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 
1992; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). Psychological 
uncertainty refers to the different representations of mathematically equivalent 
information presented as frequencies. For example, the proportion of 10% could be 
represented as either 1 out of 10 or as 10 out of 100. These studies typically find that 
participants prefer the option for which they can imagine the desired outcome occurring 
the most often (e.g., 10/100 for a chance at drawing a winning lottery ticket; Epstein, 
1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et al., 1989). However, these studies rely
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almost exclusively on lottery tasks. Experiment 3 examines whether adjusting the 
psychological uncertainty of an event will affect judgments in a civil trial.
In all three experiments, the issue at trial is whether mock jurors view the risk of 
the injury sustained during medical treatment as reasonably foreseeable prior to 
undergoing the surgery. The focus will be on how the probability of the risk occurring is 
explained (as the reason why the information was not disclosed). In doing so, these 
experiments will not only extend the research on risk communication and probabilistic 
reasoning mentioned above to civil trials, but they will also provide health care providers 
with valuable information about ways to improve communication with their patients and 
avoid malpractice claims.
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Experiment 1: Verbal vs. Quantitative Expressions of Probability 
People prefer to give estimates of probability using verbal expressions but prefer 
to receive estimates in numeric form (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Olson & Budescu, 1997; 
Shaw & Dear, 1990). This sets up a non-optimal situation for the transmission of risk 
information from health care provider to patient. Since informed consent laws focus on 
the understanding of the patient, the inherent vagueness associated with verbal 
expressions has led many to suggest that health care providers go against their 
preference and provide quantitative expressions of risk (Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Shaw 
& Dear, 1990). This suggestion, though, is typically made following mapping studies 
(where participants provide quantitative estimates of verbal expressions) which do not 
address how people use probability expressions. Indeed, while there is a great deal of 
commentary on the issue (Cliff, 1990; Cohen et al., 1958; Kadane, 1990; Kreuter, 1999; 
Mapes, 1979; Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Rothman & Kiviniemi, 1999; Shaw & Dear, 
1990; Tanur, 1990), few studies have directly compared verbal and quantitative 
expressions (e.g., Erev & Cohen, 1990; Teigen & Brun, 1999; Windschitl & Wells,
1995), and those that have do not show an advantage for quantitative expressions.
Erev and Cohen (1990) had participants rate the attractiveness of gambles on the 
outcome of basketball games (e.g., Player 1 will score more than Player 2). These 
gambles were accompanied by predictions from an expert (sportswriters and 
broadcasters) about the probability of the event occurring in either a verbal or 
quantitative format. They found that while most experts preferred to provide their 
estimates verbally, and most participants preferred to receive the estimates quantitatively,
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the probability format did not influence which gambles participants preferred to take. On 
the other hand, Windschitl and Wells (1995) found that verbal estimates o f being able to 
answer an unknown trivia question (participants were given the topic area) were better 
predictors of the questions participants chose to answer than quantitative estimates.
They also showed that verbal measures of uncertainty were more sensitive to variations 
of psychological uncertainty than numeric measures. Note that this goes against 
peoples’ preference for receiving probabilistic information in a quantitative format. 
Finally, Teigen and Brun (1999) showed that quantitative estimates of the efficacy of a 
proposed treatment for migraines led to more recommendations to undergo the 
treatment than when a negative verbal estimate was used (i.e., “quite uncertain”), but 
fewer recommendations to undergo the treatment when a positive verbal estimate was 
used (i.e., “some possibility of success”).
As can be seen from the above studies, other than decision makers preferring to 
receive probabilistic information in quantitative form, as yet, there does not appear to be 
any clear consensus concerning what effect, if any, the format of the probability estimate 
has. Of the three studies comparing verbal and quantitative expressions, one found no 
differences (Erev & Cohen, 1990), one found advantages for verbal expressions 
(Windschitl & Wells, 1995), and one found some verbal expressions increased the 
number of recommendations to undergo a medical procedure, while other verbal 
expressions decreased the number of recommendations (Teigen & Brun, 1999). 
Experiment 1 was designed to provide additional evidence on this issue by determining
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
how participants interpret and make decisions based on verbal or quantitative 
expressions of probability in a medical malpractice trial.
Mapping
In order to compare the effects that the expression of probability has on juror 
decisions, one must find the quantitative equivalents of the verbal expressions of 
probability® Numerous studies have set out to determine the quantitative equivalents for 
various verbal expressions (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Cohen et 
al., 1958; Hamm, 1991; Kong et al., 1986; Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967;Mapes, 1979; 
Mazur &Merz, 1994a, 1994b; Merz et al., 1991; MosteIIer& Youtz, 1990; Olson & 
Budescu, 1997; Reagan, Mosteller, & Youtz, 1989; Shaw & Dear, 1990; Wallsten et al., 
1986; Windschitl & Weber, 1999). Reagan et al. (1989) in reviewing 37 studies over 
two decades found that 282 different expressions had been mapped. Even though these 
studies used different methodologies (i.e., type of scale used or the order in which terms 
were presented) there was considerable agreement in the average ratings for the verbal 
expressions (Reagan et al, 1989).
However, one factor has been found to influence the quantitative estimates of 
verbal expressions: the context in which the verbal expressions are framed (Hamm, 1991; 
Mapes, 1979; Mosteller & Youtz, 1990; Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Pepper & Prytulak, 
1974; Tanur, 1990; Wallsten & Budescu, 1990; Windschitl & Weber, 1999; Winkler, 
1990; Wolf, 1990). For example, verbal estimates referring to a medical diagnosis yield
6One could also find the verbal equivalents of quantitative expressions, but the 
vast majority of research has focused on the former.
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different numerical estimates than when no referent is provided (Mapes, 1979). One 
explanation for this is that while the word meaning stays the same, the word use changes 
with the context (Clark, 1990). That is, expressions of probability are relative judgments 
and the norm with which we make the comparison changes with the context (i.e., the 
norm for tall differs when referring to people than when referring to trees).
Three studies have examined numeric interpretations specifically in patient 
populations (Mazur & Merz, 1994a, 1994b; Sutherland et al., 1991). Sutherland et al. 
(1991) had cancer patients give a numerical value for 18 word phrases used to describe 
risks in connection with fatal and nonfatal outcomes of a viral infection from blood 
transfusions. While large variability was found in patients’ numeric interpretations 
across all of the word phrases, no significant differences were found due to the severity 
(fatal vs. nonfatal) of the outcome. While this could be taken as evidence against context 
affecting the interpretations, it was most likely due to the scale they used, as nearly half 
of the patients chose the lowest value on the scale. As such, Mazur and Merz (1994a) 
found that when more options were included at the low end of the scale used by 
Sutherland et al., participants not only assigned lower probabilities but the probability 
estimates became lower the more severe the outcome. Thus, they found support for the 
context influencing interpretations.
Because of the differences due to the scale used, Mazur and Merz (1994b), 
repeated the above study without including a scale. Instead, following the presentation 
of the case, patients were asked “1 out of how many patients would have the adverse 
outcome if the physician told you the chance of the outcome was rare?” Again, large
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variability was found in patients’ interpretations of verbal expressions of probability with 
the probabilities becoming lower the more severe the outcome. This is yet another 
example of differences due to the context. They also found that personal characteristics 
of the patients influenced their interpretations of the verbal terms. For example, older 
patients (above 65 years old) responded with higher probabilities than younger patients 
(below 65 years old), and those who perceived themselves to be in extremely good or 
very good health responded with lower probabilities than other patients.
In addition to the above empirical studies, Merz et al. (1991) examined the 
quantitative equivalents of verbal expressions of probability that were used in actual 
informed consent cases. They reviewed appellate and trial court opinions from 1951 
through 1989 which included a verbal expression of probability presented by a physician 
(either as a defendant or an expert witness) and the corresponding quantitative estimate. 
They were able to map 32 expressions in this way. As in the experimental mapping 
studies, they found large variability in the interpretation of verbal expressions. 
Unfortunately, they did not have enough data to examine the effect the severity of the 
injury had on these interpretations.
Iniurv Severity
Jurors have a tendency to be influenced by “extra-legal” factors when deciding 
liability and determining damage awards (Bomstein & Rajki, 1994; Cather, Greene, & 
Durham, 1996; Feigenson, Park, & Salovey, 1997; Goodman, Greene, & Loftus, 1989; 
Hans & Vidmar, 1986) even when they are told that they should not be swayed or 
influenced by any sympathy or prejudice for or against any of the parties (Feigenson et
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al., 1997; Wright & Ankerman, 1993). One extra-legal factor that has been shown to 
affect liability decisions is the severity o f the injury suffered (Bomstein, 1998). The 
“severity effect” holds that the greater the harm, the more responsible the person who 
caused it (Wallsten, 1966). This finding has been found for both product liability 
(Bomstein, 1998) and medical malpractice cases (Bovbjerg et al., 1991). Bomstein
(1998) found that verdicts in favor of the plaintiff were more likely for those severely 
injured, but the effect was mediated by sympathy for the plaintiff (i.e., more severe injury 
led to more sympathy for the plaintiff which led to more verdicts in plaintiff’s favor). 
Similarly, Feigenson et al., (1997) found that when attributing fault and awarding 
damages, participants were especially sensitive to the blameworthiness of the victim 
when the consequences of the accident were severe rather than mild.
In a slightly different vein, Caplan, Posner, & Cheney (1991) found that ratings 
of appropriateness of care, as judged by anesthesiologists reviewing cases involving 
adverse outcomes, changed with the severity of the outcome. In their study, the more 
severe the negative outcome the lower the proportion of appropriate care ratings. Note 
that these differences due to severity can also be construed as examples of the context 
influencing decisions.
While the severity of the injury is considered an extra-legal factor in liability 
determinations, compensatory damage awards are expected to be influenced by severity, 
and the evidence generally indicates that gross damage awards do roughly correlate with 
the severity of the victim’s injury (Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, & Hsieh, 1991; Rodgers, 1991; 
Rodriguez & Boggett, 1989; Vidmar, 1995; see Cather, Greene, & Durham, 1996 for an
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exception). Brennan, Sox, & Burstin (1996) in reviewing actual malpractice cases found 
the severity of the injury to be the only significant predictor of the damage award.
In the above examples, severity has been defined as the negative outcome either 
in a products liability case or medical malpractice case. Severity though can also 
influence decisions prior to the knowledge of an outcome in its influence on participants’ 
desire to participate in their treatment decision making (Beisecker, 1988; Blanchard, 
Labreque, Ruckdeschel, & Blanchard, 1988; Ende et al., 1989). Ende et al. (1989) 
reported that the more serious the hypothetical disease situation, the less patients wanted 
to be involved in decisions. This tendency was supported by Blanchard et al. (1988), 
who found that those who preferred the health care provider to make the decisions had a 
lower performance status (i.e., were more severely injured). This may come about 
because as the severity of the illness increases, patients may feel that they do not possess 
adequate knowledge concerning the illness to participate effectively in treatment 
decision-making (Thompson et al., 1993). This could play an important role in trials in 
that jurors will most likely be in better health than patients or plaintiffs, and thus would 
want to be more active in their treatment. That being the case, they would most likely 
require more information from the physician. Thus, when asked to determine what a 
reasonable person would need to know, their reference point may be different from 
someone who is ill at the time.
Experiment 1 uses a medical malpractice case to examine if the type of 
probability expression used (i.e. verbal or quantitative) influences mock juror decisions.
It will also explore the effect the severity of the injury has in connection with
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participants’ interpretation of the probabilities. Finally, because it has been suggested 
that the more severe the possible risk, the lower the threshold for disclosure (Faden & 
Beauchamp, 1986), Experiment 1 will also manipulate the probability of the risk. 
Hypotheses
Two of the basic requirements for obtaining an informed consent are (1) to
disclose the probable adverse outcomes of medical and/or surgical interventions and (2)
to disclose the risks that are reasonably foreseeable at the time that consent is obtained.
Taken together, these two requirements suggest that physicians should inform the patient
of a risk the more likely that risk is to occur. As such, Hypothesis I states:
Hypothesis 1.1 Mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, award more in 
damages, assign the defendant more liability, provide more favorable 
ratings of the plaintiff, and rate the plaintiff as being less informed as 
the likelihood of the outcome increases.
Note that Hypothesis 1 is a direct test of whether mock jurors follow informed consent
law which previous research in this area has not done.
Previous research has shown that the severity of the injury affects both damage
awards and liability decisions such that the more severe the injury the greater the damage
award and the more liability decisions against the defendant (Bomstein, 1998; Bovbjerg
et al., 1991; Feigenson et al., 1997). As such, Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 1.2 For the more severe injury mock jurors will find the defendant liable 
more often, award more in damages, assign the defendant more 
liability, have more favorable ratings of the plaintiff and rate the 
plaintiff as being less informed.
Previous research is mixed on whether verbal expressions are responded to 
differently from quantitative ones. Erev and Cohen (1990) failed to find differences,
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Windschitl and Weils (199S) found an advantage for verbal expressions, and Teigen and 
Brun (1999) found quantitative expressions resulted in more recommendations for 
treatment than negative verbal expressions, but fewer recommendations than positive 
verbal expressions. These findings, coupled with the fact that the task used in the 
present study is different from those employed in previous comparisons, provide no clear 
basis for how mock jurors will react to probability evidence presented either verbally or 
quantitatively. As such, since two of the previous three studies found some type of 
difference Hypothesis 3 states:
Hypothesis 1.3 Mock jurors will respond differently to verbal expressions than to
quantitative expressions of probability. However, no predictions will 
be made concerning the direction of these differences.
Method
Participants. Participants were S3S undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra 
credit for their participation. Sixty-seven percent of the participants were female and 
84% were white. The mean age was 18.83 years (SD = 2.63, Mdn = 18).
Design. Experiment 1 is a 2 (severity of injury) x 3 (probability expression) x 3 
(base rate) between subjects design. The three levels of probability expression are if the 
physician describes non-disclosure of the risk of the plaintiffs injury by using either a 
verbal expression of probability, a quantitative expression of probability, or a 
combination of both. Previous studies examining verbal expressions experimentally in a 
medical context have focused mainly on the interpretation of the word “rare” (Mapes, 
1979; Mazur & Merz, 1994a, 1994b). As such, the current experiments will base the
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probability estimations on the word rare and its quantitative equivalent. The verbal 
expressions used will be extremely rare for the low base rate of occurrence, rare for the 
middle base rate, and uncommon for the high base rate of occurrence. “Uncommon” 
was chosen because the median value of its quantitative equivalent is considered to be a 
“low” probability of occurrence (as opposed to high occurrence words such as common, 
frequent, and great likelihood) by Merz et al. (1991), and is sufficiently different from 
“rare’s” equivalent that a difference may be expected.
The quantitative equivalents are 6 out of 10,000 for “extremely rare,” 27 out of 
10,000 for “rare,” and 630 out of 10,0007 for “uncommon” as found in Merz, Druzdzel, 
and Mazur (1991). The Merz et al. (1991) study is used to determine the quantitative 
equivalents because it was the only study that includes all of the verbal phrases used in 
this study (the complete Merz et al. mappings are included in the Appendix). However, 
it should be noted that the quantitative equivalent to the adjective “rare” used here 
(27/10000), is approximately equal to the mean value found across the conditions and 
studies of Mazur and Merz (1994a, 1994b).
The severity of injury is manipulated based on the severity of injury scale used by 
Merz (1991). This scale is an ordinal ranking of physical consequences ranging from 1 
(infection) to 10 (death) and is very similar to a severity scale developed by Daniels and 
Andrews (1989) for the analysis of medical malpractice issues in the 1970s. For this 
experiment, two injuries were chosen to represent a moderate and a severe negative
7 As is apparent, the magnitude of the difference between rare and extremely rare 
is smaller than that between rare and uncommon. Unfortunately, this was necessary due 
to the lack of a verbal equivalent of the same difference in magnitude above rare.
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outcome. The moderately severe injury is paresthesia (6 on the severity scale), which is 
an abnormal sensation of the body such as numbness, tinglinĝ  or burning. The highly 
severe injury is quadriplegia (9 on the severity scale).8 A pilot study asking participants 
to rank the severity of these injuries on a 7-point scale verified that quadriplegia (M = 
6.56, SD = 0.81, n = 16) is viewed as a more severe outcome than paresthesia (M =
4.71, SD = 1.26, n = 17), t(31) = 4.98, p < .05. The results of this pilot study also 
indicated that overall, there was an approximately equal split between liable (47%) and 
not liable (53%) verdicts.
Materials. A two-page case summary was chosen for this experiment to ensure 
the salience of the reasoning for non-disclosure of the risk of the injury sustained. The 
summary is based on an actual case in which the plaintiff successfully sued on a claim of 
a lack of informed consent (Gibbons, 1999). The summary includes sections on the facts 
of the case, the plaintiffs claims, the defendant’s claims, and a description of informed 
consent law. Also included with the case summary is the informed consent form signed 
by the plaintiff. This form is one that is currently used by the Earl K. Long Medical 
Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The facts of the case include a description of the plaintiff what led her to seek 
treatment in the first place, the discovery of a tumor, the decision to undergo surgery to 
remove the tumor, the outcome of the surgery (e.g., injury to the spinal cord resulting in
‘Death (10 on the severity scale) was not chosen as the severe outcome because 
the trend is for higher damage awards the more severe the injury until death, then there is 
a drop in the damages awarded (Bovbjerg et al., 1991). In order to avoid any odd 
findings associated with death, the next most severe injury was chosen.
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either paresthesia or quadriplegia), and a statement indicating that the issue for the case 
is informed consent, not the competency of the physician during the surgery. The 
plaintiffs case states that the physician never informed the plaintiff of the risk of her 
injury occurring and produces the consent form which does not list the risk for her injury 
as evidence. The defendant’s case describes how much time the physician spent 
discussing the surgery with the plaintiff and indicates that the risk was not disclosed 
because it does not occur often enough to warrant disclosure.
The description of informed consent law identifies the information required, the 
consent standard (what a reasonable person would want to know), and the legal standard 
for civil trials (preponderance of the evidence). It also states that if the physician is 
found liable, then the plaintiff is entitled to compensation and describes the effects the 
injury has had on her life. An ad damnum9 is not included because the manipulation of 
the severity of the injury is expected to produce different damage awards. Previous 
research has shown that, when included, the ad damnum is the modal amount awarded 
(Chapman & Bomstein, 1996; Goodman et al., 1989; Raitz, Greene, Goodman, &
Loflus, 1990; Zickafoose & Bomstein, 1999). That being the case, if the ad damnum is 
kept constant across the severity conditions, then it is likely that no differences in 
damage awards would be found between the conditions. Alternatively, if different ad 
damnnms are presented for each severity manipulation, then it will not be clear if 
differences are due to the severity of the injury or to participants’ anchoring on the ad 
damnum
9An ad damnum is the amount in damages that is requested by the plaintiff.
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Dependent Variables. Participants made their decisions using a verdict form
containing (1) a verdict choice (liable / not liable for malpractice), (2) a total damage
award (for those who found the defendant liable), (3) a determination of the percentage
of responsibility attributed to each party (culpability), (4) a rating of the degree to which
the consent was informed (7-point likert scale) and (5) overall perception ratings of both
the plaintiff and the physician (7-point likert scale). Participants were also asked to rate
their agreement with the following questions (7-point likert scale).
A reasonable person would require to be informed about the potential risk of 
quadriplegia (paresthesia) for this surgery, in order to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to undergo the procedure.
Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of quadriplegia (paresthesia), she would 
NOT HAVE decided to undergo the surgery.
Informed consent statutes require that both of these statements be responded to in the
affirmative for a physician to be found liable for a lack of informed consent. Participants
were asked for their agreement to these statements for two reasons. First, they serve as
a check to determine if participants conform to the legal prescription. And second, they
help to determine if the defense’s strategy was effective for one statement, but not the
other (i.e., mock jurors may have decided that a reasonable person would want to know
the information, but that it would not have affected the decision to undergo treatment).
Procedure. Participants read the case summary and a copy of the informed
consent form and then completed the verdict form individually. There was no
deliberation, and the entire process took approximately 10-15 minutes.
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Results
The liability judgments were subjected to a logistic regression with expression, 
severity, and base rate entered as categorical predictor variables. Due to the 
unexpectedly low number of participants returning liable verdicts (39% across all 
conditions), there was insufficient sample size for a complete factorial analysis of the 
damage awards. As such, participants were collapsed across conditions in order to carry 
out planned comparisons of main effects concerning the hypotheses on the natural log of 
the damage awards (one-way ANOVAs for base rate and expression of probability, and 
an independent t-test for injury severity). The natural log was used to account for the 
skewed nature of the data that is expected when damage awards are collected (Cather et 
al., 1996; Chapman & Bomstein, 1996; Moller, 1996,1997; Shanley, 1985; Wissler, 
Evans, Hart, Morry, & Saks, 1997; Zickafoose and Bomstein, 1999).10 All other 
dependent variables were subjected to a 2x3x3 between subjects ANOVA.
Hypothesis 1.1 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, 
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability (culpability), provide more 
favorable ratings of the plaintiff, and rate the plaintiff as being less informed as the 
likelihood of the outcome increases. The base rate of the injury occurring did not 
significantly effect any of these variables. See Table 1 for means and significance levels. 
The ratings of how informed the plaintiff was marginally significant though with post-hoc
10Analyses were also conducted on the median (of the raw damage awards) 
amounts awarded. While these analyses did not result in different findings the medians 
will be provided for illustrative purposes.
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Table 1. Means (standard deviations), cell sizes, and significance levels for base rate.
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F(2,512) = 2.58 
.05 < p < .10
F(2,196) = .291 
E=.75
F(2,515) = 7.84 
E <  .001
Note. Within a column, means with same subscript are not significantly different from each other at e < .05. Damage 
awards are in the form of the natural log.
analyses indicating that the plaintiff was rated as being significantly more informed in the 
low base condition than the high base rate condition (t(355) = 2.25, £ < .05, q2 = .010). 
The middle base rate condition was not significantly different from either of the other 
base rate conditions (t’s < 1.18, £*s > .24).
Interestingly, the base rate of the injury occurring did significantly affect the 
ratings of the severity of the injury, F(2,515) = 7.84, £ < .05, q2 = .03. Here, the high 
base rate condition was rated as significantly less severe than the low base rate condition, 
t(357) = 3.96, £ < .001, and the middle base rate condition, t(358) = 2.19, £ < .05. The 
difference between the low and middle conditions was marginally significant, t(351) = 
1.76, .05 < £ < .10. See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations.
In other words, while the base rate did not directly impact the liability, 
culpability, or damage awards, it did influence perceptions of the severity of the injury 
and ratings of how informed the patient was.
Hypothesis 1.2 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, 
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability, have more favorable ratings 
of the plaintiff, and rate the plaintiff as being less informed as the injury becomes more 
severe. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. The severity of the 
injury was found to be a significant predictor of the liability decision, £ = 1.39, £ < .05, 
with participants finding the defendant liable more often when the surgery resulted in 
quadriplegia (45%) than when it resulted in paresthesia (33%). There was also a 
significant main effect for defendant culpability, F(l,495) = 4.47, £ < .05, q2 = .009, with 
participants finding the defendant more culpable when the surgery resulted in
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Sign. (3= 1.39 E < ,05
F(l,495) = 4.47 
E< .05
F(l,517) = 4.46 
E< .05
F(l,512) = 2.53 
R= 11






quadriplegia, as opposed to paresthesia. This main effect was qualified by a the three- 
way interaction, F(4,495) = 2.82, p < .05, if  = .022, which indicated that severity only 
had an effect in the high base rate condition when a quantitative expression of probability 
was used (either alone, t(60) = 1.86, p = .03, severe: M = 58.87, SD = 26.98, n = 31; 
moderate: M = 45.71, SD = 28.62, n = 31) or in conjunction with a verbal expression 
t(51) — 3.23, p < .001, severe: M = 69.90, SD = 23.30, n = 29; moderate: M = 46.24,
SD = 31.76, n = 29). See Figure 1 for graph. The severity of the injury was also found 
to have a main effect for ratings of the overall impression of the plaintiff F(l,517) = 
4.46, p  < .05, q2 = .009, with the plaintiff receiving higher ratings when the injury was 
more severe.
Again, due to the limited number of participants awarding damages, the data 
were collapsed across conditions in order to assess Hypothesis 1.2.11 As expected, 
participants awarded significantly more in damages when the surgery resulted in 
quadriplegia (M = $1,641,291; SD = $5,110,164; Mdn = $500,000), than paresthesia (M 
= $782,040; SD = $2,014,634; Mdn = $100,000), t(197) = 2.22, p < .05, rf  = .018.
Contrary to expectations, severity did not significantly effect the ratings of how 
informed the plaintiff was, F(l,512) = 2.53, p =  .11, although, the means were in the 
expected direction.
Hypothesis 1.3 predicted that mock jurors would respond differently to verbal 
expressions than to quantitative expressions of probability. Contrary to expectations,
“None of the other main effects or interactions were significant in the full 
factorial analysis paving the way for collapsing across conditions.
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Figure 1. Three way interaction for defendant culpability.
Note. Significant differences between the moderate and severe injuries are indicated by conditions with the *.
how the probabilities were communicated did not reach significance for any of the 
dependent variables (see Table 3 for means and levels of significance). However, for all 
the dependent variables, except verdict choice (same percent voting liable), there was a 
tendency for verbal expressions alone to result in higher scores than the quantitative 
expressions alone.
Components of Liability. In order to ensure that participants were not treating 
the questions concerning the two conditions necessary for finding the defendant liable as 
tapping the same underlying construct, the correlation was computed between them. 
Since this correlation was fairly low, r = .23, it appears that participants treated them as 
two independent questions, and responses to each question were therefore subjected to 
separate 2x3x3 between subjects ANOVAs. As with the liability judgments and 
culpability ratings, there was a main effect of injury, F(l,517) = 4.02, £ < .05, q2 = .008, 
for agreement with the statement that “A reasonable person would require to be 
informed about the potential risk of quadriplegia (paresthesia) in order to make an 
informed decision about whether or not to undergo the surgery.” Again, participants 
agreed with the statement more when the injury was severe (M = 5.11, SD = 1.79), than 
when the injury was moderate (M = 4.80, SD = 1.76). No other main effects or 
interactions were significant for this variable.
There were no significant main effects or interactions concerning agreement with 
the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of quadriplegia (paresthesia) she 
would not have decided to undergo the surgery.”
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Significance |3’s<.82 £>’s > .12
F(2,495) = 2.23 
f i=. l l
F(2,517)= 1.18 
p=.32
F(2,512) = .171 
2=  .84
F(2,196) = ,604 
fi=.55
Note. Median damage awards were $250,000, $100,000, and $250,000 for verbal, quantitative, and both respectively.
Manipulation Check. Participants were asked to rate the severity of the 
plaintiffs injury after the surgery (7 point scale) as a check on the injury severity 
manipulation. The responses were subjected to the same 2x3x3 between subjects 
ANOVA as the rest of the data. As in the pilot studies, quadriplegia (M = 6.3 8, SD = 
.94) was seen as more severe than paresthesia (M = 5.01. SD = 1.23), F(l, 515) =
212.71, £ < .05. Interestingly, there was also a significant main effect of base rate for 
the severity ratings. This finding was described above in relation to Hypothesis 1.1.
Supplementary Analyses. Mackauf (1999) has claimed that jurors are willing to 
forgive almost any malpractice if they like the health care provider (i.e., find him/her to 
be caring, competent, and compassionate). However, if jurors do not like the health care 
provider (i.e., find him/her to be arrogant, lazy, or incompetent), they will find against 
him/her even if no malpractice occurred. If this is true, then one would expect that those 
deciding in favor of the plaintiff (defendant liable) would also have a better overall 
impression of her, while those deciding in favor of the defendant (defendant not liable) 
would also have a better overall impression of him. This is exactly what was found. 
Participants voting liable had a higher overall impression of the plaintiff t(521) = 12.88, 
p < .05 (liable: M = 4.61, SD = 1.13, n = 206; not liable: M = 3.37, SD = 1.04, n = 317), 
while those who voted not liable had a higher overall impression of the defendant, t(519) 
= 12.54, £ < .05 (not liable: M = 4.63, SD = 1.01, n = 316; liable: M = 3.47, SD = 1.05, 
n = 205).
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Discussion
Previous research has indicated that decision makers prefer to receive 
probabilistic information in quantitative terms (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Olson & Budescu, 
1997; Shaw & Dear, 1990). This is thought to be so because quantitative expressions 
are more precise and informative. Experiment 1 set out to determine if the format of 
probabilistic information influenced juror decisions. The results of Experiment 1 suggest 
that the manner in which probabilistic information is communicated (i.e., verbally or 
quantitatively) does not influence liability, damage awards, or culpability decisions.
While this finding is consistent with the results of Erev and Cohen (1990), who failed to 
find a difference between verbal and quantitative expressions of predictions when rating 
the attractiveness of gambles on the outcomes of basketball games, it is inconsistent with 
other findings (Teigen & Brun, 1999; Windschitl & Wells, 1995).
The current study is conceptually similar to that of Teigen and Brun (1999), 
which asked participants to recommend whether a patient should undergo treatment 
(acupuncture for migraines) based on the estimate of the efficacy of the proposed 
treatment. This is akin to the component of liability question concerning whether or not 
the defendant would have had the surgery had she been given the risk information. 
Teigen and Brun found that when using negative expressions, quantitative estimates 
resulted in more recommendations for treatment than verbal estimates. They proposed 
that positive verbal expressions suggest behaviors in line with the target outcome, 
whereas negative expressions suggest opposite behaviors. In their study, negative verbal
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expressions would suggest that the treatment was unlikely to succeed, thereby resulting 
in fewer recommendations to undergo the treatment.
Following their description of what are positive (i.e., “some possibility”) and 
negative (i.e., “quite uncertain”) verbal expressions, the verbal expressions used in the 
current experiment (i.e., “extremely rare”, “rare”, “uncommon”) would be considered 
negative expressions. However, the current study differs from that of Teigen and Brun
(1999) in that their referent was the likelihood of success of the treatment, while in the 
current study, the referent was the likelihood of the occurrence of a negative side effect. 
This effectively reverses the predictions that would be made. For example, if a negative 
verbal expression suggests that the opposite would occur, one would assume that 
patients given a negative verbal expression concerning a negative outcome would 
consider it unlikely for that negative outcome to occur. Thus, it would be expected that 
participants receiving negative verbal estimates would be more likely to suggest that the 
patient would have still undergone the surgery, had she been told of the consequences.
The results of the current study, however, do not support this finding. Not only 
was the F-test not significant in the overall model, F(2,515) = 2.39, p > .05, but the 
means reflect the opposite pattern of what Teigen and Brun (1999) would predict, with 
higher ratings of agreement that the defendant would have had the surgery anyway in the 
quantitative expression condition (M = 3.12, SD = 1.81, n = 179) than in the verbal 
expression condition (M = 3.31. SD = 1.81, n = 176).12
12Note that for this question, lower values reflect more agreement.
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A possible reason for the difference between the current study and that of Teigen 
and Brun (1999) could be the seriousness of the treatment choice involved. In Teigen 
and Brun, the choice concerned treatment for the relief of migraines. In the current 
study, the treatment was to remove a tumor. The latter may be a more serious condition 
resulting in nearly everyone recommending surgery no matter what. Indeed, the means 
in both conditions suggest that she would have had the surgery. Thus, repeating the 
current study with a less serious initial condition, thereby making the option of non­
treatment more acceptable, might lead to a replication of the results of Teigen and Brun.
A second goal of Experiment 1 was to examine what effect the severity of the 
injury has on juror decisions. A great deal of evidence exists suggesting that injury 
severity influences decisions even when it is not supposed to (Bomstein, 1998; Bovbjerg 
et al., 1991; Feigenson et aL, 1997; Wallsten, 1966). This is exactly what was found, 
with the more severe injury resulting in more liability decisions, higher culpability ratings, 
larger damage awards, and better overall impressions of the plaintiff. The severe injury 
also resulted in higher rates of agreement that a reasonable person would have wanted to 
know of the risk of the injury. However, injury severity did not influence ratings of 
whether the plaintiff would have still undergone the surgery had she known of the risk.
It should be noted, though, that the effect of injury severity was marginally significant 
(F(l,515) = 3.45, .05 < g < .10), with participants indicating that the plaintiff would be 
somewhat less likely to have had the surgery when the injury was severe (M = 3.47, SD 
= 1.88, n = 268) than when it was moderate (M = 3.18. SD = 1.85, n = 265).
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A third goal was to examine what effect the base rate of the injury occurring has 
on juror decisions. Since possible complications should be disclosed the more likely an 
injury is to occur, it was expected that mock jurors would find the defendant more liable 
and award more in damages as the base rate increased. While the trend in liability 
decisions followed this pattern, it did not reach significance (damage awards did not 
follow this pattern). One possibility for this lack of significance is that the base rate 
manipulation may not have registered. That is, participants may not have been able to 
distinguish between the various base rate levels. Siegrist (1997) suggests that people 
interpret probabilities as either low or high, and that it is difficult for them to get an 
accurate feeling for the specific level of the risk. Likewise, Camerer and Kunreuther 
(1989) state that people ignore risks that fall below a certain threshold (anything below 
that threshold is viewed as the same). It could be that all 3 base rates were considered 
below this cutoff and were thus indistinguishable from each other. However, no 
manipulation check was included to ascertain this possibility.
Finally, Experiment 1 examined Mackauf s (1999) claim that juror decisions are 
in part based on how much they like the physician (i.e., find him/her to be caring 
competent, and compassionate). Consistent with this claim, it was found that those 
voting liable also had higher overall ratings of the plaintiff, while those voting not liable 
had higher overall ratings of the defendant. Because the liability decision was not 
manipulated, we cannot make a direct causal connection between the two, but this 
information does provide evidence in support of Mackauf s claims.
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Experiment 2: Frequency vs. Percentage
Experiment 1 examined whether mock jurors respond differently to probabilities 
expressed verbally than to probabilities expressed quantitatively. Even though no 
differences were found in juror responses, the ambiguity inherent in verbal expressions 
has led many commentators to suggest that health care providers should at least include 
a quantitative expression when discussing uncertain outcomes, if for no other reason 
than to improve patient comprehension (Merz et al., 1991; Merz et al., 1993; Nakao & 
Axelrod, 1983; Olson & Budescu, 1997; Shaw & Dear, 1990). The question then 
becomes, are all quantitative expressions created equally? The short answer is “no.” 
Previous research has found that participants respond differently to quantitatively 
equivalent information presented in different probability formats (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1996; Gigerenzer & Hoflfrage, 1995; Siegrist, 1997; Slovic et al., 2000; Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994).
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995) claim that Bayesian algorithms are 
computationally simpler when probabilistic information is presented as frequencies rather 
than as percentages. Information presented as frequencies requires fewer operations, the 
operations can be performed on whole numbers rather than fractions, only two kinds of 
information need to be attended to (three are required for percentages),13 and the 
information about sample size included in frequencies allows for inferences beyond single 
point estimates. They presented participants with hundreds of Bayesian problems and
“Frequencies only require d&h and d&-h (where d=data and h=hypothesis). 
Percentages require p(H), p(D|H), and p(D|-H) (often called base rate, hit rate, and false 
alarm rate respectively)
48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
found that statistically naive participants responded in a Bayesian manner in nearly 50%
of the problems when probability information was presented as a frequency. This finding
is contrary to the findings of much of the heuristics and biases research (most of which
present probability information in the form of percentages), which typically finds less
than 20% of the responses conforming to Bayesian reasoning (Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1972). Mellers and McGraw (1999) agree with
Gigerenzer and Hofirage (1995) that frequencies can improve Bayesian reasoning, but
they also show that the base rate plays an important role. They found that probabilities
are more difficult to understand than frequencies, especially when events are rare, thus
leading to worse Bayesian reasoning.
Cosmides & Tooby (1996) extended these findings using the following medical
diagnosis problem:
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false 
positive rate of 5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a 
positive result actually has the disease, assuming that you know nothing
about the person’s symptoms or signs? % (Cosmides and Tooby,
1996, p. 21)14
This problem is well known in the heuristics and biases literature for eliciting base rate 
neglect, even from technically educated participants such as the faculty, staff, and fourth 
year students at Harvard Medical School (Casscells, Schoenberger, & Graboys, 1978). 
Cosmides & Tooby found that by expressing the problem in frequency terms (i.e.,
l4The correct answer is 2%, but only if one assumes that the true positive rate is 
100% (this information was not provided in the original problem), that the population 
base rate is the appropriate prior probability, and that the individual tested was randomly 
drawn from the population. If the participant believes any of these assumptions to be 
false, then other answers are correct according to Bayes’ Theorem.
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replaced ‘false positive rate of 5%’ with ‘out of every 1000 people who are perfectly 
healthy, 50 of them test positive for the disease’), 76% of participants showed correct 
Bayesian reasoning (92% of participants showed Bayesian reasoning in their most 
ecologically valid condition). Interestingly, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) also found that 
when just frequency information was presented participants were more likely to engage 
in Bayesian reasoning than if the information was presented in both frequency and 
percentages form. This suggests that not only would frequency information aid Bayesian 
reasoning, but that percentage information might actually hinder it. Some of the other 
cognitive biases that have been shown to disappear when frequency information is used 
include the conjunction fallacy (Fiedler, 1988) and overconfidence (Gigerenzer et al., 
1991).
In a slightly different vein, Siegrist (1997) presented participants with information 
about the risk of dying from taking a certain medication (either as a frequency or a 
probability). He found that the risk format and base rate interacted, such that differences 
due to the base rate only occurred when the information was presented as a frequency (6 
in 1,000,000). When presented as a probability (.000006), there was no difference 
between the base rates. He concluded that frequency information emphasizes the threat 
of the risk, and therefore should be used when comprehension of the danger is important. 
Alternatively, if one wishes to downplay the differences between risk levels, one should 
present information as a probability.
Presenting information as either a percentage or frequency has also been found to 
influence mock juror decisions (Thompson & Schumann, 1987). Thompson &
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Schumann (1987) had participants read an account of a liquor store robbery, and then 
determine the suspect’s degree of guilt (on a scale from 0-100%) both prior to, and 
following, the testimony of a forensic expert. The expert testified that a sample of the 
suspect’s hair was microscopically indistinguishable from a hair found inside the robber’s 
ski mask. The expert also described the probability that two hairs drawn at random from 
different people would be indistinguishable. They found that ratings of guilt were higher 
when the expert’s description was as a percentage (i.e., only a 2% chance the 
defendant’s hair would match the perpetrator’s if he were innocent) than when the expert 
included frequency information in his description (i.e., added to the conditional 
probability that in a city of 1,000,000 people, 20,000 people would have hair with the 
same characteristics). The authors suggest that the frequency information encouraged 
participants to think about the large number of other individuals who could have 
matched the perpetrator’s hair, thereby reducing the likelihood of his guilt.
The above studies have shown that the format of mathematically equivalent 
information can affect responses across a wide variety of tasks (Cosmides & Tooby,
1996; Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer & Hofirage, 1995; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Thompson 
& Schumann, 1987). Experiment 2 is designed to ascertain if the format of probability 
evidence presented in a medical malpractice trial influences mock juror decisions (i.e., 
liability decisions and damage awards). To do this, participants are presented with the 
same malpractice case as used in Experiment 1, with the probabilities for why the 
information was not disclosed presented as either a frequency, a percentage, or a 
combination of both. It should be noted that using an informed consent case not only
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extends this comparison of frequencies and percentages into a new domain (civil trials), 
but the manner in which the probabilistic information is used differs greatly from its use 
in cases involving associative evidence (i.e., matching blood samples, hair samples, and 
fiber samples to a suspect).
Hypotheses
As in Experiment 1, it is expected that the more likely the injury is to occur, the 
less favorable decisions will be to the defendant
Hypothesis 2.1 Mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, award more in 
damages, assign the defendant more liability, rate the plaintiff as having 
been less informed, and provide more favorable ratings of the plaintiff 
as the likelihood of the outcome increases.
Thompson and Schumann (1987) found that DNA evidence presented as 
percentages resulted in more guilty verdicts than when presented as frequencies. This 
result was also found by Koehler and Macchi (1999; as cited in Slovic et al., 2000). The 
above studies focused on the probability that the suspect was innocent given a match. 
The explanation provided for the differences is that it is easier to imagine similar 
alternatives (i.e., other people matching) when probabilistic information is presented as a 
frequency, thereby making the match appear more likely to have occurred by chance. In 
the current study, if the frequency format makes it easier to imagine similar alternatives, 
then the risk of the injury occurring will be viewed as more likely to happen. That being 
the case, Hypothesis 2 of Experiment 2 states:
Hypothesis 2.2 Mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, award more in 
damages, assign the defendant more liability, rate the plaintiff as having 
been less informed, and provide more favorable ratings of the plaintiff 
when the risk information is provided as a frequency.
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Siegrist (1997) found that the presentation of risk information and the base rate
interacted such that differences due to base rates were only found when probabilistic
information was presented as a frequency. Similarly, Mellers & McGraw (1999) found
that probabilities are more difficult to understand than frequencies, and thus not as easily
differentiated when events are rare. Thus, Hypothesis 2 for Experiment 2 predicts an
interaction between probability format and base rate such that:
Hypothesis 2.3 Differences between base rates will occur only when the probabilistic 
information is presented as a frequency. No differences between base 
rates are expected when presented as a percentage.
Method
Participants. Participants were 179 undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra 
credit for their participation. Seventy percent were female and 81% were white. The 
mean age was 19.51 years (SD = 3.34, Mdn = 19).
Design Experiment 2 is a 3 (type of expression) x 3 (base rate) between subjects 
design. The three types of expression are either the probability of the risk occurring 
expressed as a frequency, a percentage, or a combination of both. Three levels are used 
for the base rate condition (3%, .3%, .03%, and 3 in 100, 3 in 1,000,3 in 10,000). 
Because previous studies examining probabilistic information and informed consent have 
focused on “rare” occurrences (generally indicated by describing the likelihood of the 
event as rare) the frequencies chosen for this experiment are based on the quantitative 
equivalent for the word “rare” (.0027) as found by Merz et al. (1991).
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Materials. The same case summary and informed consent form is used as in 
Experiment 1 with the only changes being how the probabilities are expressed.
Dependent Variables & Procedure. The same dependent variables and procedure 
as in Experiment 1 are used.
Results
As in Experiment 1, the liability judgments were subjected to a logistic regression 
with expression and base rate entered as categorical predictor variables. Due to the 
unexpectedly low number of participants returning liable verdicts (28% across all 
conditions) there was insufficient sample size for a complete factorial analysis of the 
damage awards. As such, participants were collapsed across conditions in order to carry 
out planned comparisons concerning the hypotheses on the natural log of the damage 
awards (one-way ANOVAs for base rate, and independent t-test for expression of 
probability). All other dependent variables were subjected to 2x3 between subjects 
ANOVAs.
Hypothesis 2.1 is the same as in Experiment 1 and states that mock jurors will 
find the defendant liable more often, award more in damages, assign the defendant more 
liability, rate the plaintiff as having been less informed, and provide more favorable 
ratings of the plaintiff as the likelihood of the outcome increases. As in Experiment 1, 
the base rate of the injury occurring did not significantly affect any of these variables 
(liability decisions: £’s < .44, p’s > .30; damage awards: F(2,41) = 0.06, p = .94; 
defendant culpability: F(2,164) = 0.63, p=  .53; overall rating of the plaintiff: F(2,173) = 
0.47, p  = .63; plaintiff informedness: F(2,171) = 1.89, p = .16).
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Hypothesis 2.2 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, 
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability, rate the plaintiff as having 
been less informed, and provide more favorable ratings of the plaintiff when the risk 
information is provided as a frequency. Contrary to expectations, the format of the risk 
information did not influence any of these variables (liability decisions: {3 = 0.13, p = .70; 
damage awards: t(42) = 1.02, p = .32;IS defendant culpability: F(l,164) = 1.60, p = .21; 
overall rating of the plaintiff: F(l,173) = 0.17, p =  .68; plaintiff informedness: F(l,171) = 
0.02, p =  .90).
Hypothesis 2.3 predicts an interaction between probability format and base rate 
such that differences between base rates will only occur when the probabilistic 
information is presented as a frequency. No differences between base rates are expected 
when presented as a percentage. As with the main effects, and contrary to what was 
predicted, the interaction between probability format and base rate was not significant 
for any of the dependent variables (liability decisions: £’s < 0.44, p’s > .30; damage 
awards: F(2,38) = 1.20, p=  .31;16 defendant culpability: F(2,164) = 0.19, p=  .82; overall 
rating of the plaintiff: F(2,173) = 0.40, p=  .67; plaintiff informedness: F(2,171) = 0.23, p 
= .80).
Components of Liability. As in Experiment 1, the two questions concerning the 
conditions necessary for finding the defendant liable were subjected to 2x3 between
ISMedian damage awards were $100,000 and $50,000 for percent and frequency 
respectively.
I6Note that cell sizes ranged from 3 to 9 for this analysis, so the interpretation of 
the results must be tempered.
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subjects ANOVAs.17 As with the liability judgments and culpability ratings there were 
no significant main effects nor an interaction (F’s < 1, j)’s > .35) for agreement with the 
statement that “A reasonable person would require to be informed about the potential 
risk of quadriplegia (paresthesia) in order to make an informed decision about whether 
or not to undergo the surgery.”
However, there was a significant main effect of base rate, F(2,173) =  3.14, £ < 
.05, T|2 =  .035, for agreement with the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk 
of paresthesia she would not have decided to undergo the surgery.” Tukey’s LSD post 
hoc analyses indicated that participants disagreed with the statement more in the low (3 
in 10,000/.03%) base rate condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.73) than they did for the either 
the middle (3 in 1000/.3%) condition (M = 3.36. SD = 1.82), t(l 18) = 2.31, £ < .05, or 
the high (3 in 100/3%) condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.95), t(l 19) = 1.99, £  < .05. There 
was no difference between the middle and high base rate conditions, t(l 18) < 1.
Supplementary Analyses. As in Experiment 1, analyses were conducted to verify 
the claim of Mackauf (1999) that jurors are willing to forgive almost any malpractice if 
they like the health care provider (i.e., find him/her to be caring, competent, and 
compassionate). However, if jurors do not like the health care provider (i.e., find 
him/her to be arrogant, lazy, or incompetent), they will find against him/her even if no 
malpractice occurred. Again, evidence was found supporting this claim. Participants
l7As in Experiment 1 the correlation between the two components was low, r =
.31, suggesting that participants were not treating the two questions as the same, thereby 
allowing for each question to be analyzed separately.
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voting liable had a higher overall impression of the plaintiff t(171) = 5.90, £  < .05 
(liable: M = 4.31, SD = 1.06; not liable: M = 3.38, SD = 0.89), while those who voted 
not liable had a higher overall impression of the defendant, t(169) = 6.44, p < .05 (not 
liable: M = 4.71, SD = 0.96; liable: M = 3.63, SD = 1.02).
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment I investigating Mackauf s 
(1999) claims that liability decisions are related to one’s liking of the physician. As in 
Experiment 1, participants who voted liable also had a better overall impression of the 
plaintiffj while those who voted not liable had a better overall impression of the 
defendant.
Experiment 2's main goal of replicating previous research that has found 
differences when probabilistic information is presented as frequencies, as opposed to 
percentages, was not successful. While previous research has shown frequency 
information to increase Bayesian reasoning (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995), reduce cognitive biases (Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer et al., 1991), 
influence medical decisions (Siegrist, 1997), and reduce the number of guilty verdicts in 
a criminal trial (Thompson & Schumann, 1987), Experiment 2 failed to find any 
differences in liability decisions, culpability ratings, damage awards, overall impression of 
the plaintiff, or ratings of how informed the plaintiff was due to the format of the 
probabilistic information (frequency vs. percentage). In particular, the results cast doubt 
on Siegrist’s (1997) suggestion that frequency information emphasizes the risk and thus 
should be used when comprehension of the danger is important. If this is the case, then
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one would expect that in a medical malpractice trial concerning a lack of informed 
consent, the frequency information would emphasize the threat of the non-disclosed risk 
resulting in more judgments against the physician/defendant. However, this was not the 
case, as no differences were found due to the probability format.
One possibility for the failure to replicate is that the current study uses a different 
task (i.e., a civil trial) from any of the previous research. However, the conceptual 
similarities between the criminal trial of Thompson and Schumann (1987) and the civil 
trial used in the current study would suggest this is not the case. In both trials 
probabilistic evidence was presented-hair matching in Thompson and Schumann (1987), 
and testimony describing why risk information was not disclosed in the current 
study-and a verdict choice was made (guilt or liability). Thus, the underlying structure 
of the two studies is similar enough to expect consistent findings. In spite of these 
similarities, there may be something special about medical malpractice trials. For 
example, medical malpractice trials typically result in more verdicts in favor of the 
defendant than other civil trials. Plaintiffs have been found to win only about 20-33% of 
malpractice trials, while they win between 44-50% of product liability trials (Moller, 
1996; Taragin, Willett, Wilczek, Trout, & Carson, 1992). It may be that there is a bias 
favoring physicians that overrides any effects that the probability format would exert. 
There is also evidence that malpractice cases result in higher damage awards than other 
types of cases (Bovbjerg et al., 1991; Chin & Peterson, 1985; Hammitt, Carroll, & 
Relies, 1985); however, Vidmar (1993,1995) has provided persuasive evidence 
countering those claims. Even so, expanding the current studies to cover other types of
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civil trials (e.g., product liability) may have more success replicating the previous 
research.
Another possibility concerning the discrepancy in findings revolves around the 
explanation that Thompson and Schumann (1987) provided for their results. They 
suggest that frequency information encourages participants to think about the large 
number of other individuals who could have matched the perpetrator’s hair. Thus, not 
only does the frequency information force participants to consider the base rate, it 
suggests that the numbers used in the numerator of the frequency play an important role. 
That is, the larger the number in the numerator, the more alternatives one is able to 
generate. In the current study, that would suggest that the larger the numerator, the 
more times one could imagine the complication actually occurring resulting in more 
decisions against the physician-defendant. In the current experiment, though, the 
numerator in the frequency information stayed constant (it was always three), while the 
denominator was adjusted to manipulate the base rate of occurrence. It could be that 
participants ignored the denominator and focused on the numerator. This is similar to 
the idea o f psychological uncertainty, which refers to the concept that mathematically 
equivalent ratios can take on different meanings when the numbers making up the ratio 
are altered. This concept is more fully addressed in Experiment 3.
As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was unsuccessful in eliciting an effect of base 
rate for liability decisions or damage awards. Again, no manipulation check was 
included, so it is not clear if participants were able to distinguish between the different 
base rates. Thus, future studies should ensure that the base rates are being attended to.
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A final finding concerns the agreement with the two statements composing the 
components of liability. As in Experiment 1, the format of the expression of probability 
did not influence agreement levels with either the statement “A reasonable person would 
require to be informed about the potential risk of paresthesia...” or the statement “Had 
Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of paresthesia, she would not have decided to undergo 
the surgery.” However, participants did agree with the second statement more in the 
high base rate condition than the low base rate condition. This finding was not found in 
Experiment 1. However, this may be due to the fact that in Experiment 1, the low base 
rate condition was based on a verbal equivalent which was not as low as the low base 
rate used in Experiment 2. Thus, Experiment l's manipulation may not have been 
sensitive enough to obtain this difference.
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Experiment 3: Psychological Uncertainty 
It has been argued that people naturally represent probabilistic information in 
frequencies (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hasher & Zacks, 
1979; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). It has further been shown that certain cognitive biases 
(i.e., base rate neglect and conjunction fallacy) can be eliminated when probabilities are 
expressed as frequencies instead of as percentages (Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer et al., 
1991). However, Experiment 2 was unable to find a difference between frequencies and 
percentages. One possibility for the lack of a difference in Experiment 2 is that not all 
frequencies are created equal, and thus the frequencies used were not sufficient to elicit 
differences. If that is the case, then one should be able to obtain different responses to 
different expressions of the same frequencies.
The absolute size of the numbers used to represent a frequency has been shown 
to influence decisions (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 
1989; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). In examining this issue, participants are typically 
presented with two buckets containing the same ratio of winning tickets but with 
different absolute numbers (e.g., 1 in 10 or 10 in 100 are winners). Participants are then 
asked to indicate which bucket they would prefer to draw from. The typical finding is 
that participants would rather draw from the bucket containing 10 winning tickets out of 
100 than from the bucket containing 1 winning ticket out of 10, even though they realize 
that the odds are the same for both buckets (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et al., 
1989). This differential response rate has led to the conclusion that mathematically 
equivalent ratios can be psychologically different, and has been called “psychological
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uncertainty” (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et aL, 1989; Windschitl & Wells,
1996).
Kirkpatrick & Epstein (1992), using the lottery task described above, found that 
both the ratio of winners (either 10% or 90%), and whether the task was framed as 
drawing a winning or losing ticket, influenced the decision. When participants could win 
or lose real money, participants preferred to draw from the bowl with more tickets when 
10% were winners (i.e., preferred 10/100 to 1/10), and from the bowl with fewer tickets 
when 90% were winners (i.e., preferred 9/10 to 90/100). When framed in terms of a 
losing ticket, participants preferred to draw from the bowl with more tickets when 90% 
were losers, and to draw from the bowl with fewer tickets when 10% were losers. Thus, 
the framing of the information reversed the preference pattern. This finding is consistent 
with previous research on the framing of information in which most people are risk 
averse when information is framed in terms of gains, but are more likely to select a risky 
option when information is framed in terms of losses (Kuehberger, 1998; Levin, 
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998)
One explanation provided for framing effects revolves around the ability to 
imagine alternative outcomes (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et al., 1989). After 
learning of an outcome, participants imagine the ways a similar outcome (or opposite 
outcome depending on which is made salient) might have occurred. The ease with which 
alternatives can be imagined determines the normality of an event, with abnormal events 
evoking more surprise, distress, and suspicion than normal ones (Miller et al., 1989).
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One might suggest that framing effects only occur when the task is not 
meaningful to participants, and thus, they do not actively examine the issue (Lauver & 
Rubin, 1990; Llewellyn-Thomas, McGreal, & Thiel, 1995; Siminoff & Fetting, 1989; 
Wilson, Wallston, & King, 1990). As such, framing presumably would not play a 
significant role in patients’ decisions regarding their own health, assuming their health is 
meaningful to them. A number of studies, though, have found that the framing of 
options does influence hypothetical medical decisions. These decisions include choosing 
to undergo surgery (Rybash & Roodin, 1989; Wilson, Kaplan, & Schneiderman, 1987), 
choosing to abort a child affected with haemophilia (Wilson et al., 1987), choosing 
whether to become pregnant based on the probability of the child having a serious heart 
abnormality (McNeil, Pauker, & Tversky, 1988), and choosing between drug treatments 
(Kuhn, 1997). Thus, it appears that how information is presented to the patient can have 
a substantial impact on the decision made.
In an informed consent case jurors are presented with the outcome (some injury 
to the patient) and are expected to determine if the occurrence of the injury was 
foreseeable, thereby requiring the risk of that injury to have been disclosed. If the health 
care provider had not disclosed that information, his/her defense will most likely be 
based on why it was not disclosed. Consequently, the absolute numbers used by the 
physician in describing the probability (in frequency terms) of the injury occurring may 
cause mock jurors to view mathematically equivalent probabilities as more or less likely 
to occur, which in turn, could affect judgments of liability.
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Experiment 3 examines how psychological uncertainty (PU) affects mock juror 
decisions by manipulating the magnitude of the numbers composing the frequency used 
to describe the risk of an injury occurring. It is expected that high psychological 
uncertainty will result in decisions more favorable to the plaintiff, while low 
psychological uncertainty will result in decisions more favorable to the defendant. 
Experiment 3 also examines if framing the frequencies in terms of the likelihood of an 
injury occurring versus the likelihood of an injury not occurring influences mock juror 
decisions. The same case summary is used as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Hypotheses
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) showed that when a lottery choice involves a 
negative outcome (e.g., drawing a losing ticket), participants prefer the option with 
fewer similar alternatives (e.g., 1/10 are losers preferred over 10/100 are losers). If the 
risk of paresthesia occurring is viewed as similar to a negative lottery choice, then 
patients would prefer to take the risk when fewer similar alternatives are available (e.g., 
1/370 as compared to 100/37,000). Thus, since mock jurors are supposed to decide 
what the patient would have done had the risk of paresthesia been disclosed, they should 
find in the plaintiff’s favor more often when psychological uncertainty is high rather than 
low (because when psychological uncertainty is high a reasonable person would be more 
likely to refuse treatment). Consequently, participants will be more biased against the 
defendant, resulting in Hypothesis I:
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Hypothesis 3.1 Mock jurors wOl find the defendant liable more often, award more in 
damages, assign the defendant more liability, and have more favorable 
ratings o f the plaintiff (and less favorable ratings of the defendant) in 
the high PU condition than in the low PU condition.
Based on previous research in which changing how the information is framed
reverses participants’ preferences (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992) Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 3.2 Framing and psychological uncertainty will interact such that
participants will be more favorable to the plaintiff in the negative frame 
and more favorable to the defendant in the positive condition.
Method
Participants. Participants were 112 undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra 
credit for their participation. Sixty-four percent were women and 83% were white. The 
mean age was 19.17 years (SD = 2.29, Mdn = 19).
Materials & Design. Experiment 3 is a 2 (framing) x 2 (psychological 
uncertainty) between subjects design. Framing is manipulated by indicating the number 
of surgeries in which the injury does (negative) or does not (positive) occur. That is, the 
physician states either that 1 in 370 surgeries result in paresthesia or 369 in 370 surgeries 
do not result in paresthesia. Note that paresthesia is used as the injury to avoid any 
ceiling effects as may be encountered by a more severe injury.
The two levels of psychological uncertainty (PU) are 1 in 370 (low), and 100 in 
37,000 (high). These were chosen to represent the verbal equivalent of the word “rare” 
as determined by Merz et al. (1991). The same case summary is used as in Experiments
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1 and 2, with the above changes to the probability of the risk occurring in the physician’s 
explanation of the non-disclosure.
Procedure & Dependent Variables. The same procedure and dependent variables 
are used as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
As in Experiments I and 2, the liability judgments were subjected to a logistic 
regression (frame and psychological uncertainty entered as categorical predictor 
variables), and the damage awards were collapsed across conditions in order to carry out 
planned comparisons (due to the low number of liable verdicts: 38% across conditions1*) 
concerning the hypotheses on the natural log of the damage awards (independent t-tests 
for both factors). All other dependent variables were subjected to 2x2 between subjects 
ANOVAs.
Hypothesis 3.1 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, 
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability, and have more favorable 
ratings of the plaintiff in the high PU condition than in the low PU condition. An 
independent samples t-test found that participants did indeed award more in damages 
when psychological uncertainty was high (M = 11.85, SD = 2.15, n = 23) than when it 
was low (M = 10.47, SD = 2.40, n = 16), t(37) = 1.87, £  < .05, t]2 = 103.19 However, 
contrary to expectations, psychological uncertainty did not have a significant effect on
“This is slightly higher than that found in Experiment 2 (28%) and the 
paresthesia injury condition of Experiment 1 (33%).
I9Raw damage award values are: HighPU (M = $1.133.913: SD = $2.819.576: 
Mdn = $100,000) and Low PU (M = $442,188; SD = $1,243,369; Mdn = $30,000).
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any of the other variables (liability decisions: = . 18, £ = .74; defendant culpability: 
F(l,103) = 0.77, £ = .38; overall rating of the plaintiff: F(l,108) = 1.99, £ = .16; plaintiff 
informedness: F(I,106) = 0.004, £=  .95).
Hypothesis 3.2 states that framing and psychological uncertainty will interact. A 
significant cross-over interaction was found for plaintiff informedness, F( 1,106) = 4.21, £ 
< .05, tj2 = .038 (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations). This interaction 
indicates that when psychological uncertainty is low, participants rate the plaintiff as 
significantly more informed in the negative frame than in the positive frame, t(52) = 1.63, 
£ < .05. Conversely, when psychological uncertainty is high, participants rate the 
plaintiff as more informed in the positive frame than in the negative frame, although this 
difference does not reach significance, t(54) = 1.26, £=.11.





n = 27 n = 28
5.22 4.71
Negative (1.05) (1.30)
n = 27 n = 28
” “
This interaction was not significant for any of the other dependent variables 
(liability decisions: = .36, £ = .66; damage awards: F(l,35) = 0.06, £=  .81;20 defendant
“ Since cell sizes ranged from 5-12, so any conclusions must be tempered.
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culpability: F(l,103) = 0.06, £ = .81; and overall rating of thejriaintiff: F(l,108) = 0.99, 
£=.32).
Framing Effects A main effect of framing was found for the defendant 
culpability ratings, F(l,103) = 3.84, £ < .05, q2 = .036, such that the defendant was rated 
as more culpable in the positive frame condition (M = 58.81, SD = 27.50, n = 57) than in 
the negative frame condition (M = 49.30, SD = 22.68, n = 50). This main effect was not 
significant for the liability decision (£ = .12, £ = .83), damage award (t(37) = .74, £ = 
.23), overall rating of the plaintiff (F(l, 108) = .002, p = .97), or ratings of plaintiff 
informedness: F(l, 106) = 0.07, £ = .79).
Components of Liability. The two questions concerning the conditions necessary 
for finding the defendant liable were subjected to 2x2 between subjects ANOVAs.21 As 
with the culpability ratings, there was a main effect of framing, F(l, 106) = 6.72, £ < .05, 
q2 = .060, for agreement with the statement that “A reasonable person would require to 
be informed about the potential risk of paresthesia in order to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to undergo the surgery.” Participants agreed with the statement 
more when the risk information was framed negatively (M = 5.40, SD = 1.51), than 
when framed positively (M = 4.58, SD = 1.75). Neither the main effect for 
psychological uncertainty nor the interaction was significant for this question, F’s < 1,
£*s > .39.
21 As in Experiments 1 and 2, the correlation between the two components was 
low, r = .29, suggesting that participants were not treating the two questions as the 
same, thereby allowing for each question to be analyzed separately.
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There were no significant main effects or interactions, P s  < 1, j>’s > .38, 
concerning agreement with the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of 
paresthesia she would not have decided to undergo the surgery.” Thus, it appears that 
message framing influenced ratings of what a person would want to know, but would not 
have influenced the decision to undergo the surgery.
Supplementary Analyses. The same supplementary analyses as in Experiments 1 
and 2 were conducted, replicating the results previously found. Participants voting liable 
had a higher overall impression of the plaintiff, t(102) = 6.27, £ < 05 (liable: M = 4.41, 
SD = 0.82; not liable: M = 3.22, SD = 1.01), while those who voted not liable had a 
higher overall impression of the defendant, t(101) = 3.93, £ < .05 (not liable: M = 4.63, 
SD = 0.98; liable: M = 3.79, SD = 1.13).
Discussion
Mixed support was found for the hypotheses of Experiment 3. As expected, 
participants awarded more in damages when psychological uncertainty was high than 
when it was low. However, psychological uncertainty did not significantly affect any of 
the other dependent variables. One reason for not obtaining an effect for any of these 
other variables may have to do with the task. Previous research on psychological 
uncertainty has presented participants with two options of the same probability to choose 
from. That is, participants typically see both levels of psychological uncertainty. In the 
current study, participants were exposed to only one level of psychological uncertainty.
It could be that without having a second option to choose from, one does not focus on 
the properties of the numbers making up the frequency resulting in the typical findings.
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Future studies on psychological uncertainty in a medical situation may want to present 
the information in two ways, such as a second opinion from another physician, and then 
have the patient decide which physician they would prefer to perform the procedure.
Partial support was also found for the expected interaction between framing and 
psychological uncertainty. A significant cross-over interaction was found for ratings of 
how informed the plaintiff was, but not for any other dependent variable.
Another main finding was that participants rated the defendant as being more 
culpable when the risk information was framed as occurring, than when it was framed as 
not occurring. However, participants also had higher ratings of agreement that a 
reasonable person would want to be informed about the risk of paresthesia when the 
information was framed as not occurring than when framed as occurring. This pattern 
seems to contradict itself as one would expect that the defendant would be held more 
responsible when participants were more likely to feel that the information should be 
disclosed.
Finally, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the supplementary analyses were replicated, 
again showing that participants voting liable had a higher overall impression of the 
plaintiff, while those voting not liable had a higher overall impression of the defendant.
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Experiment 4: Treatment Choice 
The three previous Experiments have addressed how jurors make decisions partly 
based on whether or not the plaintiff would have made the same choice had she been 
provided the non-disclosed information. However, jurors in this task, already know of 
the negative outcome (surgery resulted in an injury). Having this knowledge of the 
negative outcome may cause jurors to assign too much weight to the information 
concerning the non-disclosed risk. This is known as the hindsight bias, and has been 
shown to influence many types of decisions (Casper & Benedict, 1993; Christensen- 
Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Fischhoff 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Thompson,
Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981; Zickafoose & Bomstein, 1999).
Because the effect size of the hindsight bias has been shown to be larger the less 
familiar one is with the task, the trial situation may be especially susceptible to the 
hindsight bias due to the difficulty and unfamiliarity of the tasks that jurors are expected 
to perform (i.e., determining liability and awarding damages) (Christensen-Szalanski & 
Willham, 1991; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). For example, Casper and Benedict (1993) 
manipulated outcome information in a search and seizure trial. Participants were told 
that, in the search, police either found or did not find heroin. Participants awarded more 
in damages when no heroin was found as opposed to when heroin was found. 
Furthermore, Zickafoose and Bomstein (1999) found that mock jurors, in a medical 
malpractice case, are unable to ignore the amount of negligence contributed by the 
plaintiff resulting in “double discounting” of the damage award. Thus, knowing the 
outcomes can influence mock juror decisions.
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Since hindsight has been shown to influence mock juror decisions, it would be 
important to know if participants in the previous three Experiments would make the 
same decisions without knowledge of the negative outcome. Experiment 4 addresses 
this problem, by replicating Experiment 3 using a slightly different task.
Instead of determining liability in a trial, participants in Experiment 4 are given a 
summary containing the same information concerning the initial complaint and the 
physician’s recommendation and discussion of the risks involved as used in the previous 
Experiments. This summary though, stops at the point of the patient deciding whether 
or not to undergo the surgery. At this point, the participant is informed of the potential 
risk of paresthesia associated with the surgery (the patient is not told of this 
information). The participant is then asked to indicate whether or not the patient should 
undergo the surgery (using a 7-point scale anchored by definitely should undergo the 
surgery, and definitely should not). No information concerning the outcome of the 
surgery is provided in the summary.
Hypotheses
Participants are supposed to decide what the patient should do had the risk of 
paresthesia been disclosed. This is similar to the agreement ratings of whether the 
plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery had she been informed of the risk of 
paresthesia in Experiments 1-3. Consequently, the same hypotheses from Experiment 3 
are used for Experiment 4.
Hypothesis 4.1 Participants will indicate that the patient should still undergo the 
surgery more when PU is low than when PU is high.
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Based on previous research in which changing how the information is framed
reverses participants’ preferences (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992) Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 4.2 Framing and psychological uncertainty will interact such that
participants will indicate that the patient should undergo the surgery in 
the negative frame but should not undergo the surgery in the positive 
frame.
Method
Participants. Participants were 74 undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra 
credit for their participation.
Materials & Design. Experiment 4 is a 2 (framing) x 2 (psychological 
uncertainty) between subjects design. The same basic facts used in the case summary in 
Experiments 1-3 are used for Experiment 4. This includes, the initial complaint leading 
to the patient going to her physician, the recommendation of the physician to see a 
specialist, the specialist’s recommendation to undergo treatment, and the amount of time 
spent by the physician going over the procedure. The scenario also states that the 
patient is not informed of the risk of paresthesia. The main difference between the 
previous studies and Experiment 4 is that instead of participants determining liability in a 
malpractice lawsuit, participants were asked to indicate whether the patient should 
undergo treatment had she been given the information about the risk of paresthesia. 
Nowhere in the scenario is there an indication of the outcome of the surgery, thereby 
reducing the impact of hindsight on the decision. However, hindsight may still play a
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role since participants are given information the patient is not (the probability of 
paresthesia occurring).
Dependent Variable and Procedure. Participants read the one page scenario and 
then answered the following question on a seven-point scale, anchored by “definitely 
should” and “definitely should not”: “Given the risk of paresthesia, please indicate below 
whether you believe that Mrs. Emerson should undergo the surgery to alleviate the 
numbness in her arm that led her to see her doctor in the first place.“ The entire 
procedure took approximately 5-10 minutes.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 4 was an attempt to see if decisions made without the negative 
outcome information would be affected by psychological uncertainty and framing. To 
test this, the agreement ratings were subjected to a 2(framing) x 2(psychological 
uncertainty) between subjects ANOVA. It was found that participants felt that the 
patient should still undergo the surgery significantly more when the risk information was 
framed in terms of the injury not occurring (M = 5.57, SD = 1.19) than when framed as 
the injury occurring (M = 4.78, SD = 1.65), F(l,70) = 5.50, p < .05. Neither the main 
effect for psychological uncertainty nor the interaction was significant (F(l,70) = 1.39, p 
= .24; F(l,70) = 0.22, p = .64 respectively).
The question asked in Experiment 4 is akin to that in Experiment 3 asking for 
agreement to the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of paresthesia, she 
would NOT HAVE decided to undergo the surgery.” While framing did not reach 
significance on this question in Experiment 3, the trend was the same as found in
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Experiment 4. As in Experiment 3, psychological uncertainty did not significantly effect 
the ratings of whether or not the patient should still undergo the surgery.
The fact that framing had an effect in Experiment 4, while not having an effect in 
Experiment 3, lends credence to the theory that hindsight played a role in the lack of 
results in Experiment 3. Typical findings of hindsight studies indicate that participants 
are unable to ignore outcome information resulting in different decisions than when not 
presented the outcome information (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Hindsight is a very 
robust phenomenon (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) and has been found to occur both when 
making judgments for yourself and when evaluating decisions of other people (Baron & 
Hershey, 1988; Mitchell & Kalb, 1981). For example, Baron and Hershey (1988), 
examining medical treatment decisions and monetary gambles, found that outcome 
information influenced evaluations of the quality of the decision, the competence of the 
decision maker, and the willingness of the subject to let the decision maker make 
decisions for them. Mitchell and Kalb (1981) also showed that hindsight can be applied 
to other peoples’ decisions by exploring how outcome information influenced supervisor 
performance ratings. They found that the outcome of the decision was more important 
in the supervisors’ ratings than the actual decision made. So, once again, knowing the 
outcome of some series of events influences how people perceive those events.
In the current Experiments, when participants do not know of the negative 
outcome resulting from the surgery (Exp. 4), they are more likely to believe that the 
patient should undergo the surgery when it is framed in a manner that appears to limit 
the possibility of that injury occurring. However, if the outcome information is known
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(Exp.3 ), then participants are no more likely to recommend undergoing the surgery 
according to the framing of the risk. Thus, knowing the outcome information, resulted 
in different recommendations. However, since Experiment 4 did not directly manipulate 
hindsight, future studies that directly test this conclusion are necessary.
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General Discussion
The current experiments were designed with two main goals in mind. First, they 
were designed to ascertain how the conveyance of risk information affects juror 
decisions, thereby providing suggestions on how to present arguments concerning 
probabilities in the most effective manner The second goal was to replicate and extend 
the literature on how people understand and utilize probabilistic information. A medical 
malpractice case involving a claim of a lack of informed consent was chosen for this 
purpose because it addresses both goals. It involves a legal claim which health care 
providers face, some say at a growing pace (Annas, 1976; Curran, 1970; Hirsh & 
Wilcox, 1992; Slovenko, 1997), and it makes the probability of a non-disclosed risk 
occurring very salient. That is, the point of contention is why the patient was not 
informed of the possibility of the complication occurring. Thus, how the probability of 
that risk occurring is presented would conceivably play a large role.
In regard to the first goal, Experiments 1 and 2 found that mock jurors’ liability, 
culpability, and damage award decisions were all not significantly affected by the format 
of the probability expression. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that whether the 
probability of the complication occurring was described with a verbal estimate, 
quantitative estimate, or a combination of both did not matter. Experiment 2 extended 
this by finding no differences between probabilities expressed as percentages or 
frequencies. The results of the first two Experiments also indicate that the base rate of 
the complication arising does not play a role in mock juror liability and damage award 
decisions. However, it could be that the base rate manipulation was not sufficiently
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salient and was thus ignored by the participants, while they focused on other aspects of 
the summary. Even if the manipulation was salient enough, it could be that the base 
rates used were all sufficiently low that they fell below some threshold for action 
(Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989). If that is the case, then participants could have been 
aware of the base rate, but treated all of the conditions as essentially the same. This 
possibility is bolstered by the finding of a three-way interaction for culpability in 
Experiment 1. It examining this interaction, it was found that the severity of the injury 
only had an effect (i.e., more severe injury resulting in higher culpability ratings) in the 
high base rate condition when a quantitative expression of probability was used (either 
alone or in conjunction with a verbal expression). This would suggest that the high base 
rate condition may have been above the threshold, while the other two conditions were 
not. However, since a manipulation check for comprehension of the base rate 
manipulation was not included, strong conclusions about the (non)effects of base rate on 
mock juror decisions are not warranted.
The results of Experiment 3 indicated that how frequency information is framed 
affected culpability ratings. Mock jurors rated the defendant as being more culpable 
(responsible) when the risks were framed as “The injury occurs in 1 out of 370 
procedures” than when framed as “The injury does not occur in 369 out of 370 
procedures.” Thus, it would appear that if physicians are confronted with a lack of 
informed consent case, their safest strategy for being judged least responsible would be 
to focus the description on how often the injury does not occur. However, this was only 
examined with frequency information. Further research needs to be conducted to
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determine if this relationship holds for information presented as probabilities and 
percentages as well.
Experiment 3 also found that mock jurors awarded more in damages when the 
psychological uncertainty was high as compared to when it was low. This would suggest 
that when using frequency information, the interests of the defendant are best served by 
reducing the ratio of the frequency so that the numerator reflects smaller absolute 
numbers. Conversely, plaintiffs would be best served to adjust the ratio so that the 
numerator contains larger absolute numbers. However, since this is the first experiment 
to examine how psychological uncertainty affects damage awards, much more research is 
needed to explore the boundaries of this phenomenon before any strong 
recommendations can be made.
Taken as a whole, the results of Experiments 1-3 indicate that the probability 
expression used to describe the likelihood of a complication occurring during a medical 
procedure has little impact on the mock jurors’ liability ratings and damage awards.
Given the null results within each experiment, and the fact that there was little variation 
across all three experiments in either culpability ratings (values ranged from 47%-58%) 
or liability decisions (26%-42%), there is little basis for recommending the use of any 
one type of probability expression over another. As such, it would be beneficial to 
compare the current results to those of previous researchers, in order to provide 
recommendations.
Siegrist (1997) suggests using frequency information when one wants to 
emphasize the threat of a risk and to use probabilistic expressions to downplay
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differences between risk levels. Accordingly, in a trial situation where the defendant is 
trying to downplay the likelihood of a risk occurring, he/she would be better off by not 
using frequency information. On the other hand, if a health care provider wants a patient 
to understand a risk, or some other type of probabilistic information, then, according to 
Siegrist, presenting that information as a frequency may be more effective. Experiment 
4, which examined how participants believed a patient would act based on some 
probabilistic information, found that how the information was framed influenced whether 
or not participants would recommend undergoing treatment. However, Experiment 4 
did not directly compare frequency and percentage expressions, and thus did not provide 
a meaningful evaluation of Siegrist’s claims.
Experiments 1-3, however, did directly address the claims by Siegrist (1997).
Not only did Experiments 1-3 fail to find evidence supporting Siegrist’s suggestion, but 
an examination of the damage awards provides evidence against it. While null results 
were the typical finding concerning mean damage awards (with the exception of a main 
effect due to psychological uncertainty in Experiment 3), the small sample size and large 
negative skew of the data suggest that the median amounts may be more informative 
than the mean awards. In examining the median awards across all three experiments, a 
pattern emerges (see Table 5 for the median damage award for each expression of 
probability across Experiments 1-3).
Beginning with Experiment 1, it can be seen that higher median damages were 
awarded when a verbal expression of probability was used (either alone or in conjunction 
with a quantitative value) than when a quantitative expression was used. Experiment 2
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then explored two different types of quantitative expression and found that frequency 
expressions resulted in lower median awards than percentage expressions. Finally, 
Experiment 3 examined two different types of frequency expressions and found that 
having low psychological uncertainty resulted in lower median awards than high 
psychological uncertainty. Thus, the lowest median award was for a frequency 
expression, while the highest median award was for a verbal expression. This pattern, 
coupled with the null results in liability and culpability ratings, suggests that physician- 
defendants who wish to maximize their defense (i.e., decrease the likelihood of being 
found liable, but if they are, then decrease the damage award) should express probability 
information in terms of frequencies with low psychological uncertainty. This contradicts 
the suggestion by Siegrist (1997).
Table 5. Median damage award amounts for probability expressions across experiments.









High Psychological Uncertainty 100,000
Low Psychological Uncertainty 30,000
The second goal of the current experiments was to replicate and extend the 
previous research concerning the interpretation and use of probabilistic information and
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juror decision making On this account, there was limited success. Experiment 1 was 
able to replicate previous research indicating that the severity of the injury influences 
both liability decisions (Bomstein, 1998; Feigenson et al., 1997) and damage awards 
(Bovbjerget al., 1991; Feigenson et al., 1997; Rodgers, 1991; Vidmar, 1995).
However, the current experiments failed to replicate previous research showing that the 
type of probability expression used influences participants’ decisions (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hof&age, 1995; Siegrist, 1997; Slovic et al., 2000; Tversky 
& Koehler, 1994; Teigen & Bran, 1999; Windschitl & Wells, 1995). While this was the 
first attempt to extend these findings to a civil trial, the similarities between the task used 
here and in previous research (e.g., the criminal trial used by Thompson & Schumann, 
1987, and Siegrist’s (1997) examination of decisions based on the probability of a 
complication arising from a medical treatment) is enough to suggest that similar findings 
should result. However, it might not be just a civil trial, but the fact that it was a medical 
malpractice trial. As mentioned earlier, malpractice trials tend to be treated differently 
from other types of trials. Nearly all malpractice claims (93%) are settled out of court 
(or discontinued or dismissed) before trial. Of the 7% making it to trial, 50% of those 
are settled during trial. Of the 3% that make it to a verdict, 80% result in verdicts in 
favor of the defendant (Mackauf 1999; Taragin et al., 1992).
Another difference between the medical malpractice case used here and 
Thompson and Schumann’s (1987) criminal trial revolves around the fact at issue. In 
Thompson and Schumann’s study, the fact in dispute (as in most criminal trials) was “did 
the defendant do it.” Thus, the probability evidence was presented to answer the
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question, “Did the hair sample match the defendant?” In the current studies, whether or 
not the defendant “did it” is not in dispute — the risk information admittedly was not 
disclosed. As such, the question being addressed by the evidence is “should it have been 
disclosed.” Since the jury is being asked to answer different questions in the two types 
of trials, it might be that probabilistic information may be treated differently. For 
example, when supplied to answer the “did he do if’ question, it may be viewed as the 
most relevant information. However, if the probability evidence is being introduced to 
answer the “should it have been disclosed” question, it may be only one o f many 
considerations. However, it is not clear what those other considerations may be.
A second finding in conjunction with the second goal was that across all of the 
experiments in which participants rendered a liability decision, those who determined the 
defendant was liable had a better overall impression of the plaintiff, while those who 
determined the defendant was not liable had a better overall impression of the defendant. 
This is consistent with the idea that jurors base their liability decisions, at least in part, on 
how much they like the defendant (Mackauf, 1999). Mackauf (1999) claimed that jurors 
are willing to forgive almost any malpractice if they like the health care provider (i.e., 
find him/her to be caring, competent, and compassionate) but will find against the health 
care provider if they dislike him/her (i.e., find him/her arrogant, lazy, or incompetent), 
even if no malpractice has occurred. While the current findings are not a direct test of 
these claims, they are at least consistent with the idea that personal feelings toward the 
health care provider are related to liability decisions.
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Limitations and Future Directions
The current studies were the first attempt to extend how people comprehend and 
use probabilistic information to a civil lawsuit concerning medical malpractice. In doing 
so, a number of characteristics of a real trial were altered to give the best chance of 
replicating previous findings. For instance, while the malpractice case used was based on 
an actual case in which the plaintiff won, the current studies used a two-page summary 
of the trial. Although the summary included the facts surrounding the case, it may not 
have had the same effect on jurors as an actual trial.
Two different studies have found that the mode of presentation affects 
dichotomous guilt verdicts in criminal trials (Bermant, McGuire, McKinley, & Salo,
1974; Juhnke et al., 1979). The conclusion from these studies is that researchers should 
design their studies more closely to what actually happens in the courtroom. An 
interesting finding in the Bermant et al. (1974) study is that as the mode of presentation 
became more realistic, more participants voted not guilty. However, the actual case on 
which they based the study resulted in a verdict of manslaughter. As such, maybe their 
call for greater verisimilitude in research is not necessary. In addition, Juhnke et al.
(1979) found the opposite result.
Wissler et al. (1997) suggest that short summaries may be more appropriate 
when studying damage awards, since the majority of the trial concerns the issue of 
liability. Furthermore, Wissler et al. (1997) report two unpublished studies (Hart,
Wissler, & Saks, 1994; Diamond, Dimetropoulos, Landsman, & Saks, 199S) that 
compared non-economic damage awards for 6-sentence scenarios, 14-sentence
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scenarios, and a three-hour videotaped mock trial. These studies showed that the length 
of the written case scenarios had no effect on the pain and suffering awards and that the 
mean awards for the written scenarios were within a quarter of a standard deviation of 
the awards from the videotaped trial. Kramer and Kerr (1989), in examining the biasing 
effect of pretrial publicity, also M ed to find an effect due to trial length. Bornstein 
(1999), in a review of the jury simulation literature, found eleven studies that directly 
compared the trial medium. Of those eleven studies, only three found the presentation 
medium to have a main effect on mock jurors’ verdicts. Furthermore, the results of 
those three studies were conflicting (i.e., the Bermant et al., 1974 and Juhnke et al., 1979 
studies described above). Thus, it appears that using a trial summary would not 
necessarily invalidate the current findings. However, Diamond (1997) has argued that 
because some differences have been found due to how realistic a trial is, in the interest of 
ecological validity, future studies should involve a full trial (videotaped if possible).
A second limitation is that participants did not deliberate. However, studying 
individual decisions allows for examination of the underlying processes that serve as the 
basis for the group's decision (Wissler et al., 1997), or, stated another way, the focus 
was on individual judgment processes. Even so, it has been shown that during 
deliberations damage awards may become a bartering tool that allows a compromise 
between the majority view and the minority view (Guinther, 1988). Thus, future studies 
should also include deliberations.
A final limitation is that a specific type of case (medical malpractice) involving a 
specific type of claim (lack of informed consent) was used for the current experiments.
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It has already been mentioned that malpractice cases are treated differently from other 
types of civil suits (Moller, 1996; Taragin et al., 1992). Vidmar et al. (1994) suggested 
some reasons for the differences between medical malpractice lawsuits and auto 
accidents: (1) Malpractice cases usually involve more than one defendant (auto accident 
cases usually just have one); (2) multiple theories of liability are more common in 
malpractice cases; (3) the primary dispute in malpractice cases is liability, while the 
primary dispute in auto accident cases typically hinges on damages; (4) the fact patterns 
leading to the injury are different; (5) in malpractice cases the injured plaintiff is usually a 
passive participant in the events, while in auto accident cases, it may be possible to 
assign some of the responsibility to the plaintiff; and finally (6) there is a professional and 
fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the physician. This last suggestion may 
explain why no differences were found between types of probability expressions. It 
could be that mock jurors take into account this professional and fiduciary relationship 
when making their decisions. That is, they start with the assumption that health care 
providers are motivated by helping people, and as such, are loath to find against a health 
care provider absent obvious direct evidence to the contrary. If this is the case, then 
extending the current studies to other types of civil suits could provide a better 
opportunity for replicating previous research showing that people respond differently to 
various probability expressions.
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Appendix A
Mapping of Verbal Expressions of Probability
































Very Very Minimal .0040
Note. Because the quantitative equivalents were based on anywhere from 1-10 
observations, the verbal expressions are ordered in terms of what the rankings of typical 
mapping  studies find. Bolded values are those used for Experiment 1.
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Appendix B 
Case Summary
Plaintiff- Jessie M. Emerson
Defendant: Dr. Gerald Bell and Valley Forge General Hospital
Case Description: Medical Malpractice due to Lack of Informed Consent.
Facts:
Mrs. Emerson, age 50, went to her family physician (Dr. Brian Emler) on January 
24,1992, after complaining of numbness and tingling in the left arm. Dr. Emler 
recommended that she see a specialist, Dr. Gerald Bell. On February 5, 1992, she went 
to see Dr. Bell, a neurosurgeon, who conducted a number of tests. One of the tests, an 
MRI, discovered a tumor in the spinal column. Acting on the recommendation of Dr. 
Bell, Mrs. Emerson underwent surgery on February 19,1992 to remove the tumor. 
During the removal of the small tumor, the spinal cord was injured resulting in the entire 
left side of Mrs. Emerson’s body becoming permanently numb and tingling, a condition 
known as paresthesia. At issue is whether Dr. Bell provided enough information to Mrs. 
Emerson to make her aware that the surgery could result in this condition. The actual 
consent form is included as Exhibit A.
Plaintiffs Case:
Mrs. Emerson claims that the surgery took place without the legally mandated 
informed consent because it was never fully explained to her that the entire left side of 
her body could become permanently numb and tingling as a result from the surgery. She 
states that Dr. Bell spoke to her extensively about how the surgery would be performed,
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but did not discuss the risk of paresthesia. To support her claim Mrs. Emerson’s attorney 
produced the consent form (Exhibit A) that Mrs. Emerson signed in which neither 
paresthesia nor numbness is listed as a risk factor. Mrs. Emerson claimed that had she 
known of the possibility of the entire left side of her body becoming numb she would 
have not undergone the surgery.
Defendant’s Case:
Dr. Bell claims to have spent about 15-20 minutes with Mrs. Emerson going over 
the standard informed consent used by the hospital. During this time he covered what 
the procedure would involve (what and how it would be done) and addressed her 
concerns about the procedure. He states that he explained in plain English what each of 
the risks listed on the second page of the consent form meant and provided an estimate 
of the likelihood of these risks occurring. Dr. Bell admits that paresthesia is not listed as 
a potential risk, but claims that since research shows this injury occurs in only 3 out of 
10,000 cases it does not warrant disclosure. Furthermore, Dr. Bell claims there has to be 
a cut-off in which a risk need not be explained due to the low likelihood of its 
occurrence, otherwise the potential risks for any procedure could reach into the 
hundreds, and it would take too long and confuse the patient to cover them all. Dr. Bell 
also claims that Mrs. Emerson was provided with an opportunity to ask any questions 
concerning the procedure and that she signed the form stating that all of her questions 
had been answered to her satisfaction.
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Informed Consent Law:
The case you just read is only concerned with whether or not an informed 
consent was achieved. It does NOT involve whether Dr. Bell was negligent in the 
performance of the surgery. That matter has already been resolved. You are only to 
consider the issue of informed consent.
The doctrine of informed consent requires that a patient be provided with any 
and all information that a reasonable person would require, in a manner that he/she can 
understand, in order to make an informed decision as whether to undergo a specific 
treatment. This includes a description of the procedure, the potential benefits, the 
potential risks, and the availability of alternative procedures. Informed consent is not 
merely the signing of a form giving permission to proceed, but it is a process in which 
both the patient and the health care provider exchange information allowing the patient 
to reach an informed decision concerning his/her treatment. Indeed, signed forms are not 
legally necessary.
In order to find the defendant liable for malpractice for a lack of informed 
consent, you must determine that Dr. Bell did not disclose the risk of paresthesia to Mrs. 
Emerson and that if he had, that Mrs. Emerson would not have undergone the surgery. 
The legal standard for coming to this conclusion is by a preponderance of the evidence. 
This means that the evidence shows that the defendant is more likely than not to have 
committed malpractice.
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Request for Compensation:
If you determine that Dr. Bell was negligent by not disclosing the risk of 
paresthesia, Mrs. Emerson is allowed compensation for her injuries: numbness and 
tingling of the entire left side of her body. As a result of the injuries suffered by Mrs. 
Emerson, she is also no longer is able to knit and finds it extremely difficult to cook for 
herself both activities she enjoyed prior to the surgery. Also, physically active prior to 
her injuries, Mrs. Emerson is no longer able to go swimming, or do water aerobics, and 
the numbness has made walking difficult for her.
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